Conflict and Peace: War, WMD and Deterrence
UGC NET IR: changing nature of warfare, weapons of mass destruction and arms control, nuclear deterrence, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.
- 18 min
On this page · 14 sections
- Prerequisites
- The Hook: “From Now On Its Chief Purpose Must Be to Avert Them”
- 1. War: Classical Ideas
- 2. The Changing Nature of Warfare
- 3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- 4. Deterrence
- 5. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation
- Memory Tricks
- Don’t Confuse
- Common Mistakes
- Practice
- Quick Revision Table
- Key Takeaways
- What’s Next
Prerequisites
- Approaches to IR: deterrence theory is applied realism; peace research is close to critical theory.
- State, Power, Sovereignty and Security: traditional vs non-traditional security.
- Gandhi and Nehru: satyagraha as a method of conflict transformation, and Nehru’s early call for a nuclear test ban.
The Hook: “From Now On Its Chief Purpose Must Be to Avert Them”
How UGC NET asks it: treaty → year (NPT 1968, CWC 1993, CTBT 1996, TPNW 2017); thinker → idea (Clausewitz, Schelling, Kaldor, Galtung, Lederach); India’s nuclear doctrine (2003); sequencing of arms-control treaties; assertion–reason on deterrence and the stability–instability paradox.
1. War: Classical Ideas
| Thinker | Work | Key ideas |
|---|---|---|
| Sun Tzu | The Art of War | Supreme excellence is to subdue the enemy without fighting; know the enemy and know yourself |
| Kautilya | Arthashastra | Mandala theory (the neighbour is the natural enemy, the neighbour’s neighbour a friend); six-fold policy (shadgunya): sandhi (treaty), vigraha (hostility), asana (staying quiet), yana (marching), samshraya (seeking shelter or alliance), dvaidhibhava (double policy); four upayas: sama, dana, bheda, danda |
| Carl von Clausewitz | On War (published posthumously, 1832) | War is “a continuation of policy by other means”; the trinity of passion (the people), chance (the army and its commander) and reason (the government); friction and the fog of war |
Just war tradition
From Augustine and Aquinas through Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625) to Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars, 1977):
| Branch | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Jus ad bellum (right to go to war) | Just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, reasonable probability of success, proportionality |
| Jus in bello (right conduct in war) | Distinction (discrimination between combatants and civilians), proportionality, military necessity |
| Jus post bellum (justice after war) | Fair settlement, reconstruction, accountability |
2. The Changing Nature of Warfare
From total war to “new wars”
| Phase | Character |
|---|---|
| Total war (1914–1945) | Mobilisation of whole societies and economies; industrial weapons; civilians targeted (strategic bombing) |
| Cold War (1947–1991) | Nuclear stand-off between superpowers; limited wars and proxy wars in the Third World (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan) |
| Post-Cold War | Most armed conflicts are intra-state (civil wars, ethnic conflicts, insurgencies); state collapse; humanitarian interventions |
| Twenty-first century | Terrorism and counter-terrorism; hybrid, cyber, drone and information warfare; return of inter-state war between major states |
Key thinkers on the transformation
| Thinker | Work (year) | Argument |
|---|---|---|
| Mary Kaldor | New and Old Wars (1999) | “New wars” differ in goals (identity politics, not ideology or territory), methods (terror against civilians, displacement) and financing (a decentralised, globalised war economy: looting, diaspora money, smuggling) |
| Martin van Creveld | The Transformation of War (1991) | Clausewitzian war between states is giving way to low-intensity conflict by non-state actors |
| John Mueller | Retreat from Doomsday (1989) | Major war among developed states is becoming obsolete, like duelling |
| John Lewis Gaddis | “The Long Peace” (1986) | No great-power war since 1945 |
| Rupert Smith | The Utility of Force (2005) | Industrial war has given way to “war amongst the people” |
| William Lind and co-authors | “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” (1989) | Fourth-generation warfare: the state loses its monopoly on war; blurred line between war and politics, soldier and civilian |
| Frank Hoffman | “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (2007) | Hybrid warfare: conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal methods combined in one campaign |
Features of contemporary warfare
- Asymmetric warfare: a weak actor uses unconventional means (guerrilla war, terrorism, IEDs) against a stronger one.
- Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): precision-guided munitions, satellite surveillance and networked command (the 1991 Gulf War is the usual illustration).
- Cyber warfare: attacks on networks and critical infrastructure; the Stuxnet worm (discovered 2010) against Iranian centrifuges is the standard example.
- Drones (UAVs) and lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), discussed in the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons framework.
- Grey-zone operations: coercion below the threshold of open war (maritime militias, disinformation).
- Information warfare and lawfare (the use of law as a weapon).
- Space as a war-fighting domain; anti-satellite (ASAT) tests. India conducted its ASAT test, Mission Shakti, in March 2019.
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
WMD are usually grouped as CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. Only two nuclear weapons have been used in war: Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945).
Treaty timeline
| Treaty / regime | Year | Key point |
|---|---|---|
| Geneva Protocol | 1925 | Bans the use in war of chemical and biological weapons (not their possession) |
| Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) | 1963 | Bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water (underground tests allowed) |
| Outer Space Treaty | 1967 | No nuclear weapons in orbit or on celestial bodies |
| Treaty of Tlatelolco | 1967 | First nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region (Latin America and the Caribbean) |
| Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) | Opened 1968; in force 1970; extended indefinitely in 1995 | Three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament (Art. VI), peaceful use. Nuclear-weapon states = those that exploded a device before 1 January 1967: US, USSR/Russia, UK, France, China |
| Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) | Opened 1972; in force 1975 | First treaty to ban a whole category of WMD; no verification body |
| Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) | 1974 | Formed after India’s 1974 test; export controls |
| Australia Group | 1985 | Chemical and biological export controls; India joined January 2018 |
| Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) | 1987 | Missile export controls; India joined 2016 |
| INF Treaty (US–USSR) | 1987 | Eliminated ground-launched missiles of 500–5,500 km range; US withdrew in 2019 |
| Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) | Opened 1993; in force 1997 | Bans development, production, stockpiling and use; verified by the OPCW (The Hague; Nobel Peace Prize 2013) |
| Wassenaar Arrangement | 1996 | Conventional arms and dual-use goods; India joined December 2017 |
| Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) | Opened 1996 | Bans all nuclear explosions; not in force because some of the 44 “Annex 2” states named in it have not ratified |
| New START (US–Russia) | Signed 2010; in force 2011 | Limits deployed strategic warheads and launchers; extended in 2021 to 5 February 2026, when its term ended (the treaty allowed only one extension) |
| Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) | Adopted 2017; in force 22 January 2021 | First treaty to ban nuclear weapons outright; no nuclear-armed state has joined. ICAN, which campaigned for it, won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize |
India and the non-proliferation regime
- India calls the NPT discriminatory: it freezes the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”. India has never signed the NPT, the CTBT or the TPNW. Pakistan and Israel have also stayed outside the NPT (Israel has signed but not ratified the CTBT); North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and tested in 2006.
- Tests: 18 May 1974 (Pokhran-I, “Smiling Buddha”, described as a peaceful nuclear explosion) and 11 and 13 May 1998 (Pokhran-II, Operation Shakti). Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May 1998.
- India–US civil nuclear cooperation: joint statement of July 2005; the NSG waiver of September 2008 allowed civil nuclear trade with India.
- India is now a member of MTCR (2016), Wassenaar (2017) and the Australia Group (2018), but not the NSG.
- Credible minimum deterrence.
- No first use (NFU): nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
- Retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
- Retaliatory attacks authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
- No use against non-nuclear-weapon states.
- The option of nuclear retaliation in the event of a major attack by biological or chemical weapons.
- Strict export controls, a moratorium on tests, and commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
4. Deterrence
Deterrence: persuading an adversary not to start an action by threatening costs that outweigh any gain.
Compellence (Thomas Schelling’s term, Arms and Influence, 1966): persuading an adversary to stop or undo an action already under way. Compellence is generally harder: it needs the target to act visibly under pressure.
Key theorists
| Thinker | Work (year) | Contribution |
|---|---|---|
| Bernard Brodie | The Absolute Weapon (1946) | Nuclear weapons make averting war the purpose of military power |
| Albert Wohlstetter | “The Delicate Balance of Terror” (1959) | Deterrence is not automatic; it requires a survivable second-strike force |
| Thomas Schelling | The Strategy of Conflict (1960); Arms and Influence (1966) | Bargaining, commitment, focal points, “the threat that leaves something to chance”; compellence |
| Herman Kahn | On Thermonuclear War (1960); On Escalation (1965) | “Thinking about the unthinkable”; the escalation ladder |
| Glenn Snyder | Deterrence and Defense (1961) | Deterrence by denial (making the attack fail) vs deterrence by punishment (making the attacker suffer); the stability–instability paradox (Snyder, 1965 essay) |
| Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan | The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (1995) | Waltz: more may be better; Sagan: organisational failures make proliferation dangerous |
Concepts to know
| Concept | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Three Cs of deterrence | Capability (the means), credibility (the will, believed by the adversary), communication (the threat is understood) |
| First strike / second strike | A disarming first attack vs the ability to retaliate after absorbing one; secure second strike is the basis of stable deterrence |
| Counterforce / countervalue | Targeting the enemy’s weapons vs its cities and economy |
| Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) | Each side can destroy the other even after being attacked first; war is therefore irrational |
| Massive retaliation | US doctrine announced by John Foster Dulles (1954): respond to any aggression with nuclear force |
| Flexible response | Graduated options; adopted by NATO in 1967 |
| Extended deterrence | A nuclear “umbrella” over allies |
| Minimum deterrence | A small, survivable arsenal sufficient for unacceptable retaliation (China; India’s “credible minimum”) |
| Nuclear triad | Land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, strategic bombers |
| Stability–instability paradox | Stability at the nuclear level may encourage instability (limited war, proxy conflict) at lower levels; often applied to India–Pakistan |
| Arms control vs disarmament | Regulating and limiting arms to make deterrence stable vs eliminating them |
Arms control and disarmament
Arms control accepts that weapons will exist and seeks to make deterrence stable (limits, verification, hotlines, confidence-building); the classic statement is Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (1961). Disarmament seeks to reduce or eliminate weapons altogether, the goal of “general and complete disarmament”.
| Bilateral (US–USSR/Russia) agreement | Year | Point |
|---|---|---|
| SALT I and the ABM Treaty | 1972 | Froze strategic launchers; limited missile defences to keep mutual vulnerability (the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002) |
| SALT II | 1979 | Signed but never ratified by the US |
| INF Treaty | 1987 | First to eliminate a whole class of nuclear missiles |
| START I | 1991 | First actual cuts in strategic arsenals |
| New START | 2010 | See the treaty table above |
India’s disarmament diplomacy: Nehru proposed a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing in 1954; Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented an Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order to the UN General Assembly’s special session on disarmament in 1988. India’s case against the NPT and CTBT is that they regulate proliferation without binding the nuclear-weapon states to a time-bound disarmament.
Deterrence in South Asia
- Both India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers in May 1998.
- Lahore Declaration (February 1999, Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif) and an accompanying memorandum on nuclear confidence-building, including advance notice of ballistic missile tests.
- Kargil (May–July 1999) followed within months: the textbook South Asian illustration of the stability–instability paradox, a limited war under the nuclear shadow.
- The India–Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (signed 1988, in force 1991): the two countries exchange lists of such facilities every 1 January.
- Doctrinal asymmetry: India declares no first use; Pakistan does not, and relies on nuclear weapons to offset India’s conventional superiority, including short-range systems. Debates continue over whether limited conventional strikes below the nuclear threshold are possible.
5. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation
Peace research: Galtung’s vocabulary
Johan Galtung founded the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO, 1959) and the Journal of Peace Research (1964).
| Concept | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Negative peace | Absence of direct violence (war) |
| Positive peace | Absence of structural violence; presence of justice, cooperation, integration |
| Direct violence | Visible, physical harm by an actor |
| Structural violence (“Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, 1969) | Harm built into social structures: poverty, exploitation, unequal life chances, with no single perpetrator |
| Cultural violence (article of 1990) | Aspects of culture (religion, ideology, language) that legitimise direct or structural violence |
| Conflict triangle (ABC) | Attitudes, Behaviour, Contradiction (the incompatible goals) |
Peaceful settlement in the UN Charter
Article 33 lists the methods: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means. Good offices (offering a channel without proposing terms) is also standard.
| Method | Third party role | Binding? |
|---|---|---|
| Negotiation | None | — |
| Good offices | Brings parties together | No |
| Mediation | Proposes terms | No |
| Enquiry | Establishes facts | No |
| Conciliation | Commission examines and recommends | No |
| Arbitration | Tribunal chosen by parties | Yes |
| Judicial settlement | Standing court (ICJ) | Yes |
Approaches to ending conflict
| Approach | Aim | Key names |
|---|---|---|
| Conflict settlement | Agreement that ends the fighting, often imposed by power | Power-based diplomacy |
| Conflict management | Contain and limit the conflict | Peacekeeping, ceasefires |
| Conflict resolution | Address the underlying causes so the parties no longer see their goals as incompatible | John Burton (human needs theory, problem-solving workshops); Kenneth Boulding (Conflict and Defense, 1962); Roger Fisher and William Ury (Getting to Yes, 1981: interests not positions, BATNA); I. William Zartman (ripeness: a “mutually hurting stalemate”) |
| Conflict transformation | Change the relationships, structures and cultures that generate conflict; long-term | John Paul Lederach, Building Peace (1997), The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (2003); Galtung’s TRANSCEND method |
Tracks of diplomacy
- Track I: official, government-to-government.
- Track II: unofficial dialogue among influential non-officials (term associated with Joseph Montville: William Davidson and Montville, Foreign Policy, winter 1981–82).
- Track 1.5: officials in a private capacity alongside non-officials.
- Multi-track diplomacy: Louise Diamond and John McDonald extended the model to nine tracks (business, citizens, research, activism, religion, funding, media, among others).
The UN’s peace vocabulary
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (1992): preventive diplomacy → peacemaking → peacekeeping → post-conflict peacebuilding; peace enforcement was discussed as a further category. The Supplement (1995) was more cautious after Somalia. The Brahimi Report (2000) called for robust mandates and realistic planning. UN peacekeeping is covered in United Nations and International Law.
Memory Tricks
Don’t Confuse
| This | vs | That |
|---|---|---|
| Deterrence — prevent an action (Schelling) | vs | Compellence — force an action to stop or be undone |
| Deterrence by denial — make the attack fail | vs | Deterrence by punishment — make the attacker pay (Snyder) |
| PTBT (1963) — bans atmospheric, space and underwater tests | vs | CTBT (1996) — bans all tests; not in force |
| BWC (1972) — no verification body | vs | CWC (1993) — verified by the OPCW |
| Negative peace — no direct violence | vs | Positive peace — no structural violence (Galtung) |
| Conflict resolution — address causes, end incompatibility | vs | Conflict transformation — change relationships and structures over time (Lederach) |
| Mediation — non-binding proposals | vs | Arbitration — binding award by a chosen tribunal |
| Massive retaliation (Dulles, 1954) | vs | Flexible response (NATO, 1967) |
Common Mistakes
Practice
All questions below are original practice questions written in the UGC NET format. They are not previous-year questions.
Level 1: Foundation
- Which treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as one that exploded a device before 1 January 1967?
- Who wrote New and Old Wars (1999)?
- Name Galtung’s three types of violence.
Answers
- The NPT (opened 1968, in force 1970).
- Mary Kaldor.
- Direct, structural and cultural violence.
Level 2: Exam-style MCQs
Q1. (Practice) The term “compellence” was introduced by:
- (a) Bernard Brodie
- (b) Herman Kahn
- (c) Thomas Schelling
- (d) Albert Wohlstetter
Answer and explanation
(c) Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966).
Q2. (Practice) Which of the following is not part of India’s nuclear doctrine of 2003?
- (a) Credible minimum deterrence
- (b) No first use
- (c) Use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that host foreign troops
- (d) Authorisation of retaliation only by the civilian political leadership
Answer and explanation
(c). The doctrine commits India to non-use against non-nuclear-weapon states. The other three are core elements.
Q3. (Practice) Consider the following statements:
- The Biological Weapons Convention has a dedicated verification organisation like the OPCW.
- The Partial Test Ban Treaty permits underground nuclear tests.
- The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 2021.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 2 and 3 only
- (c) 1 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation
(b) 2 and 3 only. Statement 1 is wrong: the BWC’s lack of a verification body is its best-known weakness.
Q4. (Practice) In Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid, which level is said to have the greatest potential to sustain peace by linking the others?
- (a) Top-level leadership
- (b) Middle-range leadership
- (c) Grassroots leadership
- (d) International mediators
Answer and explanation
(b) Middle-range leadership, which has links both upward to top leaders and downward to communities.
Level 3: Assertion–reason, match and sequence
For assertion–reason questions, use these options:
- (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
- (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
- (c) A is true, but R is false
- (d) A is false, but R is true
Q1. (Practice) Assertion (A): A secure second-strike capability is considered essential for stable nuclear deterrence. Reason (R): If a state can retaliate after absorbing a first strike, no adversary can expect to gain by attacking first.
Answer and explanation
(a). This is Wohlstetter’s argument in “The Delicate Balance of Terror” (1959): stability rests on survivable retaliatory forces.
Q2. (Practice) Assertion (A): The stability–instability paradox suggests that mutual nuclear deterrence may encourage limited conflict. Reason (R): Nuclear-armed states can never fight each other at any level, because any clash escalates automatically to nuclear war.
Answer and explanation
(c). A is true. R is false and contradicts A: the paradox arises precisely because states believe low-level conflict will not escalate, since both fear nuclear war.
Q3. (Practice) Match List I (Thinker) with List II (Idea).
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. Clausewitz | I. Structural violence |
| B. Galtung | II. Ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate |
| C. Zartman | III. War as the continuation of policy by other means |
| D. Lederach | IV. Conflict transformation |
- (a) A-III, B-I, C-II, D-IV
- (b) A-III, B-II, C-I, D-IV
- (c) A-I, B-III, C-II, D-IV
- (d) A-III, B-I, C-IV, D-II
Answer and explanation
(a) A-III, B-I, C-II, D-IV.
Q4. (Practice) Arrange the following in chronological order:
- Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature
- Partial Test Ban Treaty
- Biological Weapons Convention opened for signature
- Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted
- (a) 2, 3, 1, 4
- (b) 3, 2, 1, 4
- (c) 2, 1, 3, 4
- (d) 2, 3, 4, 1
Answer and explanation
(a). PTBT 1963 → BWC 1972 → CWC 1993 → TPNW 2017.
Quick Revision Table
| Item | Year | Must-know point |
|---|---|---|
| Clausewitz, On War | 1832 | Continuation of policy; trinity; friction |
| Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars | 1977 | Modern just war theory |
| Kaldor, New and Old Wars | 1999 | Identity, terror, globalised war economy |
| Hoffman, hybrid wars | 2007 | Conventional + irregular + terrorist + criminal |
| Brodie, The Absolute Weapon | 1946 | Avert war |
| Schelling | 1960, 1966 | Focal points; compellence |
| Snyder | 1961 | Denial vs punishment |
| PTBT / NPT / BWC | 1963 / 1968 / 1972 | NPT NWS cut-off 1 Jan 1967; BWC no verifier |
| CWC / CTBT / TPNW | 1993 / 1996 / 2017 | OPCW; CTBT not in force; TPNW in force 2021 |
| India’s tests | 1974; 11 and 13 May 1998 | Pokhran-I and II |
| India’s doctrine | 2003 | Credible minimum, NFU, massive retaliation, civilian control |
| Galtung | 1959, 1964, 1969, 1990 | PRIO, JPR, structural violence, cultural violence |
| An Agenda for Peace | 1992 | Preventive diplomacy → peacemaking → peacekeeping → peacebuilding |
| Lederach, Building Peace | 1997 | Transformation; three-level pyramid |
Key Takeaways
What’s Next
- United Nations and International Law — peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and the ICC
- Contemporary Challenges — terrorism as a security challenge
- Approaches to IR — the realist and critical theories behind deterrence and peace research
- International Relations — Quick Revision