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Conflict and Peace: War, WMD and Deterrence

UGC NET IR: changing nature of warfare, weapons of mass destruction and arms control, nuclear deterrence, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

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  • Updated
On this page · 14 sections
  1. Prerequisites
  2. The Hook: “From Now On Its Chief Purpose Must Be to Avert Them”
  3. 1. War: Classical Ideas
  4. 2. The Changing Nature of Warfare
  5. 3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
  6. 4. Deterrence
  7. 5. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation
  8. Memory Tricks
  9. Don’t Confuse
  10. Common Mistakes
  11. Practice
  12. Quick Revision Table
  13. Key Takeaways
  14. What’s Next

Prerequisites

The Hook: “From Now On Its Chief Purpose Must Be to Avert Them”

How UGC NET asks it: treaty → year (NPT 1968, CWC 1993, CTBT 1996, TPNW 2017); thinker → idea (Clausewitz, Schelling, Kaldor, Galtung, Lederach); India’s nuclear doctrine (2003); sequencing of arms-control treaties; assertion–reason on deterrence and the stability–instability paradox.


1. War: Classical Ideas

ThinkerWorkKey ideas
Sun TzuThe Art of WarSupreme excellence is to subdue the enemy without fighting; know the enemy and know yourself
KautilyaArthashastraMandala theory (the neighbour is the natural enemy, the neighbour’s neighbour a friend); six-fold policy (shadgunya): sandhi (treaty), vigraha (hostility), asana (staying quiet), yana (marching), samshraya (seeking shelter or alliance), dvaidhibhava (double policy); four upayas: sama, dana, bheda, danda
Carl von ClausewitzOn War (published posthumously, 1832)War is “a continuation of policy by other means”; the trinity of passion (the people), chance (the army and its commander) and reason (the government); friction and the fog of war

Just war tradition

From Augustine and Aquinas through Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625) to Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars, 1977):

BranchCriteria
Jus ad bellum (right to go to war)Just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, reasonable probability of success, proportionality
Jus in bello (right conduct in war)Distinction (discrimination between combatants and civilians), proportionality, military necessity
Jus post bellum (justice after war)Fair settlement, reconstruction, accountability

2. The Changing Nature of Warfare

From total war to “new wars”

PhaseCharacter
Total war (1914–1945)Mobilisation of whole societies and economies; industrial weapons; civilians targeted (strategic bombing)
Cold War (1947–1991)Nuclear stand-off between superpowers; limited wars and proxy wars in the Third World (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan)
Post-Cold WarMost armed conflicts are intra-state (civil wars, ethnic conflicts, insurgencies); state collapse; humanitarian interventions
Twenty-first centuryTerrorism and counter-terrorism; hybrid, cyber, drone and information warfare; return of inter-state war between major states

Key thinkers on the transformation

ThinkerWork (year)Argument
Mary KaldorNew and Old Wars (1999)“New wars” differ in goals (identity politics, not ideology or territory), methods (terror against civilians, displacement) and financing (a decentralised, globalised war economy: looting, diaspora money, smuggling)
Martin van CreveldThe Transformation of War (1991)Clausewitzian war between states is giving way to low-intensity conflict by non-state actors
John MuellerRetreat from Doomsday (1989)Major war among developed states is becoming obsolete, like duelling
John Lewis Gaddis“The Long Peace” (1986)No great-power war since 1945
Rupert SmithThe Utility of Force (2005)Industrial war has given way to “war amongst the people”
William Lind and co-authors“The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” (1989)Fourth-generation warfare: the state loses its monopoly on war; blurred line between war and politics, soldier and civilian
Frank Hoffman“Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (2007)Hybrid warfare: conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal methods combined in one campaign

Features of contemporary warfare

  • Asymmetric warfare: a weak actor uses unconventional means (guerrilla war, terrorism, IEDs) against a stronger one.
  • Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): precision-guided munitions, satellite surveillance and networked command (the 1991 Gulf War is the usual illustration).
  • Cyber warfare: attacks on networks and critical infrastructure; the Stuxnet worm (discovered 2010) against Iranian centrifuges is the standard example.
  • Drones (UAVs) and lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), discussed in the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons framework.
  • Grey-zone operations: coercion below the threshold of open war (maritime militias, disinformation).
  • Information warfare and lawfare (the use of law as a weapon).
  • Space as a war-fighting domain; anti-satellite (ASAT) tests. India conducted its ASAT test, Mission Shakti, in March 2019.

3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

WMD are usually grouped as CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. Only two nuclear weapons have been used in war: Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945).

Treaty timeline

Treaty / regimeYearKey point
Geneva Protocol1925Bans the use in war of chemical and biological weapons (not their possession)
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)1963Bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water (underground tests allowed)
Outer Space Treaty1967No nuclear weapons in orbit or on celestial bodies
Treaty of Tlatelolco1967First nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region (Latin America and the Caribbean)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)Opened 1968; in force 1970; extended indefinitely in 1995Three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament (Art. VI), peaceful use. Nuclear-weapon states = those that exploded a device before 1 January 1967: US, USSR/Russia, UK, France, China
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)Opened 1972; in force 1975First treaty to ban a whole category of WMD; no verification body
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)1974Formed after India’s 1974 test; export controls
Australia Group1985Chemical and biological export controls; India joined January 2018
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)1987Missile export controls; India joined 2016
INF Treaty (US–USSR)1987Eliminated ground-launched missiles of 500–5,500 km range; US withdrew in 2019
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)Opened 1993; in force 1997Bans development, production, stockpiling and use; verified by the OPCW (The Hague; Nobel Peace Prize 2013)
Wassenaar Arrangement1996Conventional arms and dual-use goods; India joined December 2017
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)Opened 1996Bans all nuclear explosions; not in force because some of the 44 “Annex 2” states named in it have not ratified
New START (US–Russia)Signed 2010; in force 2011Limits deployed strategic warheads and launchers; extended in 2021 to 5 February 2026, when its term ended (the treaty allowed only one extension)
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)Adopted 2017; in force 22 January 2021First treaty to ban nuclear weapons outright; no nuclear-armed state has joined. ICAN, which campaigned for it, won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize

India and the non-proliferation regime

  • India calls the NPT discriminatory: it freezes the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”. India has never signed the NPT, the CTBT or the TPNW. Pakistan and Israel have also stayed outside the NPT (Israel has signed but not ratified the CTBT); North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and tested in 2006.
  • Tests: 18 May 1974 (Pokhran-I, “Smiling Buddha”, described as a peaceful nuclear explosion) and 11 and 13 May 1998 (Pokhran-II, Operation Shakti). Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May 1998.
  • India–US civil nuclear cooperation: joint statement of July 2005; the NSG waiver of September 2008 allowed civil nuclear trade with India.
  • India is now a member of MTCR (2016), Wassenaar (2017) and the Australia Group (2018), but not the NSG.
India's nuclear doctrine (Cabinet Committee on Security, January 2003)
  1. Credible minimum deterrence.
  2. No first use (NFU): nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
  3. Retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
  4. Retaliatory attacks authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
  5. No use against non-nuclear-weapon states.
  6. The option of nuclear retaliation in the event of a major attack by biological or chemical weapons.
  7. Strict export controls, a moratorium on tests, and commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

4. Deterrence

Deterrence vs compellence

Deterrence: persuading an adversary not to start an action by threatening costs that outweigh any gain.

Compellence (Thomas Schelling’s term, Arms and Influence, 1966): persuading an adversary to stop or undo an action already under way. Compellence is generally harder: it needs the target to act visibly under pressure.

Key theorists

ThinkerWork (year)Contribution
Bernard BrodieThe Absolute Weapon (1946)Nuclear weapons make averting war the purpose of military power
Albert Wohlstetter“The Delicate Balance of Terror” (1959)Deterrence is not automatic; it requires a survivable second-strike force
Thomas SchellingThe Strategy of Conflict (1960); Arms and Influence (1966)Bargaining, commitment, focal points, “the threat that leaves something to chance”; compellence
Herman KahnOn Thermonuclear War (1960); On Escalation (1965)“Thinking about the unthinkable”; the escalation ladder
Glenn SnyderDeterrence and Defense (1961)Deterrence by denial (making the attack fail) vs deterrence by punishment (making the attacker suffer); the stability–instability paradox (Snyder, 1965 essay)
Kenneth Waltz and Scott SaganThe Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (1995)Waltz: more may be better; Sagan: organisational failures make proliferation dangerous

Concepts to know

ConceptMeaning
Three Cs of deterrenceCapability (the means), credibility (the will, believed by the adversary), communication (the threat is understood)
First strike / second strikeA disarming first attack vs the ability to retaliate after absorbing one; secure second strike is the basis of stable deterrence
Counterforce / countervalueTargeting the enemy’s weapons vs its cities and economy
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)Each side can destroy the other even after being attacked first; war is therefore irrational
Massive retaliationUS doctrine announced by John Foster Dulles (1954): respond to any aggression with nuclear force
Flexible responseGraduated options; adopted by NATO in 1967
Extended deterrenceA nuclear “umbrella” over allies
Minimum deterrenceA small, survivable arsenal sufficient for unacceptable retaliation (China; India’s “credible minimum”)
Nuclear triadLand-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, strategic bombers
Stability–instability paradoxStability at the nuclear level may encourage instability (limited war, proxy conflict) at lower levels; often applied to India–Pakistan
Arms control vs disarmamentRegulating and limiting arms to make deterrence stable vs eliminating them

Arms control and disarmament

Arms control accepts that weapons will exist and seeks to make deterrence stable (limits, verification, hotlines, confidence-building); the classic statement is Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (1961). Disarmament seeks to reduce or eliminate weapons altogether, the goal of “general and complete disarmament”.

Bilateral (US–USSR/Russia) agreementYearPoint
SALT I and the ABM Treaty1972Froze strategic launchers; limited missile defences to keep mutual vulnerability (the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002)
SALT II1979Signed but never ratified by the US
INF Treaty1987First to eliminate a whole class of nuclear missiles
START I1991First actual cuts in strategic arsenals
New START2010See the treaty table above

India’s disarmament diplomacy: Nehru proposed a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing in 1954; Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented an Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order to the UN General Assembly’s special session on disarmament in 1988. India’s case against the NPT and CTBT is that they regulate proliferation without binding the nuclear-weapon states to a time-bound disarmament.

Deterrence in South Asia

  • Both India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers in May 1998.
  • Lahore Declaration (February 1999, Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif) and an accompanying memorandum on nuclear confidence-building, including advance notice of ballistic missile tests.
  • Kargil (May–July 1999) followed within months: the textbook South Asian illustration of the stability–instability paradox, a limited war under the nuclear shadow.
  • The India–Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (signed 1988, in force 1991): the two countries exchange lists of such facilities every 1 January.
  • Doctrinal asymmetry: India declares no first use; Pakistan does not, and relies on nuclear weapons to offset India’s conventional superiority, including short-range systems. Debates continue over whether limited conventional strikes below the nuclear threshold are possible.

5. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation

Peace research: Galtung’s vocabulary

Johan Galtung founded the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO, 1959) and the Journal of Peace Research (1964).

ConceptMeaning
Negative peaceAbsence of direct violence (war)
Positive peaceAbsence of structural violence; presence of justice, cooperation, integration
Direct violenceVisible, physical harm by an actor
Structural violence (“Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, 1969)Harm built into social structures: poverty, exploitation, unequal life chances, with no single perpetrator
Cultural violence (article of 1990)Aspects of culture (religion, ideology, language) that legitimise direct or structural violence
Conflict triangle (ABC)Attitudes, Behaviour, Contradiction (the incompatible goals)

Peaceful settlement in the UN Charter

Article 33 lists the methods: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means. Good offices (offering a channel without proposing terms) is also standard.

MethodThird party roleBinding?
NegotiationNone—
Good officesBrings parties togetherNo
MediationProposes termsNo
EnquiryEstablishes factsNo
ConciliationCommission examines and recommendsNo
ArbitrationTribunal chosen by partiesYes
Judicial settlementStanding court (ICJ)Yes

Approaches to ending conflict

ApproachAimKey names
Conflict settlementAgreement that ends the fighting, often imposed by powerPower-based diplomacy
Conflict managementContain and limit the conflictPeacekeeping, ceasefires
Conflict resolutionAddress the underlying causes so the parties no longer see their goals as incompatibleJohn Burton (human needs theory, problem-solving workshops); Kenneth Boulding (Conflict and Defense, 1962); Roger Fisher and William Ury (Getting to Yes, 1981: interests not positions, BATNA); I. William Zartman (ripeness: a “mutually hurting stalemate”)
Conflict transformationChange the relationships, structures and cultures that generate conflict; long-termJohn Paul Lederach, Building Peace (1997), The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (2003); Galtung’s TRANSCEND method

Tracks of diplomacy

  • Track I: official, government-to-government.
  • Track II: unofficial dialogue among influential non-officials (term associated with Joseph Montville: William Davidson and Montville, Foreign Policy, winter 1981–82).
  • Track 1.5: officials in a private capacity alongside non-officials.
  • Multi-track diplomacy: Louise Diamond and John McDonald extended the model to nine tracks (business, citizens, research, activism, religion, funding, media, among others).

The UN’s peace vocabulary

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (1992): preventive diplomacy → peacemaking → peacekeeping → post-conflict peacebuilding; peace enforcement was discussed as a further category. The Supplement (1995) was more cautious after Somalia. The Brahimi Report (2000) called for robust mandates and realistic planning. UN peacekeeping is covered in United Nations and International Law.


Memory Tricks

Don’t Confuse

ThisvsThat
Deterrence — prevent an action (Schelling)vsCompellence — force an action to stop or be undone
Deterrence by denial — make the attack failvsDeterrence by punishment — make the attacker pay (Snyder)
PTBT (1963) — bans atmospheric, space and underwater testsvsCTBT (1996) — bans all tests; not in force
BWC (1972) — no verification bodyvsCWC (1993) — verified by the OPCW
Negative peace — no direct violencevsPositive peace — no structural violence (Galtung)
Conflict resolution — address causes, end incompatibilityvsConflict transformation — change relationships and structures over time (Lederach)
Mediation — non-binding proposalsvsArbitration — binding award by a chosen tribunal
Massive retaliation (Dulles, 1954)vsFlexible response (NATO, 1967)

Common Mistakes


Practice

All questions below are original practice questions written in the UGC NET format. They are not previous-year questions.

Level 1: Foundation

  1. Which treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as one that exploded a device before 1 January 1967?
  2. Who wrote New and Old Wars (1999)?
  3. Name Galtung’s three types of violence.
Answers
  1. The NPT (opened 1968, in force 1970).
  2. Mary Kaldor.
  3. Direct, structural and cultural violence.

Level 2: Exam-style MCQs

Q1. (Practice) The term “compellence” was introduced by:

  • (a) Bernard Brodie
  • (b) Herman Kahn
  • (c) Thomas Schelling
  • (d) Albert Wohlstetter
Answer and explanation

(c) Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966).

Q2. (Practice) Which of the following is not part of India’s nuclear doctrine of 2003?

  • (a) Credible minimum deterrence
  • (b) No first use
  • (c) Use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that host foreign troops
  • (d) Authorisation of retaliation only by the civilian political leadership
Answer and explanation

(c). The doctrine commits India to non-use against non-nuclear-weapon states. The other three are core elements.

Q3. (Practice) Consider the following statements:

  1. The Biological Weapons Convention has a dedicated verification organisation like the OPCW.
  2. The Partial Test Ban Treaty permits underground nuclear tests.
  3. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 2021.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  • (a) 1 and 2 only
  • (b) 2 and 3 only
  • (c) 1 and 3 only
  • (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation

(b) 2 and 3 only. Statement 1 is wrong: the BWC’s lack of a verification body is its best-known weakness.

Q4. (Practice) In Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid, which level is said to have the greatest potential to sustain peace by linking the others?

  • (a) Top-level leadership
  • (b) Middle-range leadership
  • (c) Grassroots leadership
  • (d) International mediators
Answer and explanation

(b) Middle-range leadership, which has links both upward to top leaders and downward to communities.

Level 3: Assertion–reason, match and sequence

For assertion–reason questions, use these options:

  • (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
  • (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
  • (c) A is true, but R is false
  • (d) A is false, but R is true

Q1. (Practice) Assertion (A): A secure second-strike capability is considered essential for stable nuclear deterrence. Reason (R): If a state can retaliate after absorbing a first strike, no adversary can expect to gain by attacking first.

Answer and explanation

(a). This is Wohlstetter’s argument in “The Delicate Balance of Terror” (1959): stability rests on survivable retaliatory forces.

Q2. (Practice) Assertion (A): The stability–instability paradox suggests that mutual nuclear deterrence may encourage limited conflict. Reason (R): Nuclear-armed states can never fight each other at any level, because any clash escalates automatically to nuclear war.

Answer and explanation

(c). A is true. R is false and contradicts A: the paradox arises precisely because states believe low-level conflict will not escalate, since both fear nuclear war.

Q3. (Practice) Match List I (Thinker) with List II (Idea).

List IList II
A. ClausewitzI. Structural violence
B. GaltungII. Ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate
C. ZartmanIII. War as the continuation of policy by other means
D. LederachIV. Conflict transformation
  • (a) A-III, B-I, C-II, D-IV
  • (b) A-III, B-II, C-I, D-IV
  • (c) A-I, B-III, C-II, D-IV
  • (d) A-III, B-I, C-IV, D-II
Answer and explanation

(a) A-III, B-I, C-II, D-IV.

Q4. (Practice) Arrange the following in chronological order:

  1. Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature
  2. Partial Test Ban Treaty
  3. Biological Weapons Convention opened for signature
  4. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted
  • (a) 2, 3, 1, 4
  • (b) 3, 2, 1, 4
  • (c) 2, 1, 3, 4
  • (d) 2, 3, 4, 1
Answer and explanation

(a). PTBT 1963 → BWC 1972 → CWC 1993 → TPNW 2017.


Quick Revision Table

ItemYearMust-know point
Clausewitz, On War1832Continuation of policy; trinity; friction
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars1977Modern just war theory
Kaldor, New and Old Wars1999Identity, terror, globalised war economy
Hoffman, hybrid wars2007Conventional + irregular + terrorist + criminal
Brodie, The Absolute Weapon1946Avert war
Schelling1960, 1966Focal points; compellence
Snyder1961Denial vs punishment
PTBT / NPT / BWC1963 / 1968 / 1972NPT NWS cut-off 1 Jan 1967; BWC no verifier
CWC / CTBT / TPNW1993 / 1996 / 2017OPCW; CTBT not in force; TPNW in force 2021
India’s tests1974; 11 and 13 May 1998Pokhran-I and II
India’s doctrine2003Credible minimum, NFU, massive retaliation, civilian control
Galtung1959, 1964, 1969, 1990PRIO, JPR, structural violence, cultural violence
An Agenda for Peace1992Preventive diplomacy → peacemaking → peacekeeping → peacebuilding
Lederach, Building Peace1997Transformation; three-level pyramid

Key Takeaways

What’s Next