Accountability and Control: Checks, Committees, Courts and Reforms
Legislative, executive, budgetary and judicial control in India, the PAC and other committees, administrative culture, corruption and ARC reforms.
- 20 min
On this page · 16 sections
- Prerequisites
- The Hook: Who Guards the Guardians?
- 1. Accountability: Meaning and Types
- 2. Legislative Control over the Executive
- 3. Executive (Administrative) and Budgetary Control
- 4. Judicial Control over the Legislature and Executive
- 5. Administrative Culture
- 6. Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Framework
- 7. Administrative Reforms
- Memory Tricks
- Don’t Confuse
- Common Mistakes
- Practice
- Quick Revision Table
- Key Takeaways
- What’s Next
Prerequisites
- Governance, Good Governance and Democratic Governance — vertical, horizontal and social accountability.
- Making of the Constitution and Constitutional Philosophy and Constitutionalism — the parliamentary system and limited government on which these controls rest.
The Hook: Who Guards the Guardians?
How UGC NET asks it: match a committee to its composition or function (PAC, Estimates, COPU, DRSCs); match a parliamentary device to its purpose (adjournment motion, cut motions); match a writ to its meaning; constitutional articles on finance and the CAG; chronology of anti-corruption bodies (Santhanam Committee, CVC, CBI, Lokpal); first vs second ARC.
1. Accountability: Meaning and Types
Accountability is the obligation of those who hold public power to explain and justify their conduct to a forum that can question, judge and impose consequences. Control is the set of devices that makes this obligation real. Responsibility (internal, a sense of duty) is sometimes distinguished from accountability (external, enforceable).
| Type | Who holds whom to account | Indian examples |
|---|---|---|
| Political / vertical | Voters → legislators and government | Elections; collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Lok Sabha (Art. 75(3)) |
| Legislative | Legislature → executive | Questions, motions, debates, committees, budget approval |
| Administrative / hierarchical | Superior → subordinate within the executive | Supervision, inspection, audit, budgetary control, discipline |
| Financial | Legislature and auditor → spending departments | CAG, PAC, Appropriation Acts |
| Judicial | Courts → executive and legislature | Judicial review, writs, PIL |
| Social / diagonal | Citizens, civil society, media → state | RTI, social audit, jan sunwai, citizen report cards |
Checks and balances
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), argued that liberty is safe only when legislative, executive and judicial power are in different hands. India does not have a rigid separation of powers: the executive sits in and is drawn from the legislature (parliamentary system). Instead it has functional separation with checks and balances:
| Organ | Checks others by | Is checked by |
|---|---|---|
| Legislature | Questions, motions, no-confidence, budget, committees, impeachment of President (Art. 61) and removal of judges (Art. 124(4)) | Judicial review of laws (Arts. 13, 32, 226); President’s assent and dissolution of the Lok Sabha on advice |
| Executive | Ordinance power (Arts. 123, 213), initiation of most legislation, appointment of judges (with collegium) | No-confidence, financial control, judicial review of executive action |
| Judiciary | Judicial review; writs; basic structure doctrine | Appointment process, removal by Parliament, constitutional amendment (within basic structure) |
Constitutional buffers: courts may not inquire into the validity of proceedings in Parliament (Art. 122) or state legislatures (Art. 212); legislatures may not discuss the conduct of a judge in the discharge of duties except on a motion for removal (Art. 121, Art. 211). Art. 50 (a Directive Principle) asks the state to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services.
2. Legislative Control over the Executive
2.1 Devices on the floor of the House
| Device | Purpose | Points to remember |
|---|---|---|
| Question Hour | First hour of a sitting; ministers answer questions | Starred (oral answer, supplementaries allowed), unstarred (written answer, no supplementaries), short notice (urgent matter, less than ten days’ notice) |
| Zero Hour | Raising matters without prior notice, immediately after Question Hour | An Indian innovation (from the early 1960s), not in the Rules of Procedure |
| Calling attention motion | Draws a minister’s attention to a matter of urgent public importance | Indian innovation (from 1954); minister makes a statement |
| Adjournment motion | Interrupts normal business to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance | Needs support of 50 members; involves an element of censure; Lok Sabha only |
| No-confidence motion | Tests whether the Council of Ministers retains the confidence of the Lok Sabha | Needs 50 members to admit; reasons need not be stated; if passed, the whole ministry resigns (Art. 75(3)) |
| Censure motion | Censures the government or a minister for specific policies or acts | Reasons must be stated; passing it does not automatically force resignation |
| Motion of thanks | On the President’s address | Defeat amounts to defeat of the government |
| Half-an-hour discussion; short duration discussion | Further discussion of a matter arising from an answer, or of urgent public importance | Short duration discussion is also called the “two-hour discussion” |
2.2 Financial (budgetary) control by Parliament
- Art. 265 — No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
- Art. 266 — Consolidated Fund and Public Accounts of India and the states. Art. 267 — Contingency Fund.
- Art. 112 — Annual Financial Statement (the budget); expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund (not voted, e.g. President’s emoluments, salaries of judges and the CAG) distinguished from other expenditure (voted).
- Art. 113 — Estimates submitted as demands for grants; the Lok Sabha may assent, refuse or reduce, but not increase.
- Art. 114 — Appropriation Bill: no money withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund without appropriation by law.
- Art. 115 — Supplementary, additional or excess grants. Art. 116 — Votes on account, votes of credit and exceptional grants.
- Art. 110 — Money Bill (Speaker’s certificate is final; Rajya Sabha can only recommend, within 14 days). Art. 117 — Financial bills.
Cut motions (on demands for grants, in the Lok Sabha):
| Cut motion | Amount | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Policy cut | Reduce the demand to Re 1 | Disapproval of the policy underlying the demand |
| Economy cut | Reduce by a specified amount | Economy in expenditure |
| Token cut | Reduce by Rs 100 | A specific grievance within the government’s responsibility |
Budget reforms to know: outcome budget (from 2005–06), gender budgeting (statement from 2005–06), budget presented on 1 February and the railway budget merged with the general budget (both from 2017–18), and the Plan / non-Plan distinction dropped from 2017–18.
2.3 Control through parliamentary committees
Parliament has too little time to examine the budget and administration in detail; committees do it continuously, away from party theatre.
| Committee | Members | Origin | Function |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public Accounts Committee (PAC) | 22 (15 LS + 7 RS) | 1921 (under the Government of India Act 1919) | Examines the appropriation accounts and the CAG’s audit reports; a post-mortem of expenditure. Chairperson by convention from the opposition (since 1967). A minister cannot be a member |
| Estimates Committee | 30, all Lok Sabha | 1950 (a standing finance committee existed from 1921) | Suggests economies and alternative policies within the budget estimates; called a “continuous economy committee” |
| Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU) | 22 (15 LS + 7 RS) | 1964 (Krishna Menon Committee’s recommendation) | Examines reports and accounts of public sector undertakings and CAG reports on them |
| Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) | 31 each (21 LS + 10 RS) | 1993 (17 at first; now 24) | Examine demands for grants, bills referred to them, annual reports and long-term policy of ministries |
| Committee on Subordinate Legislation | — | — | Whether delegated powers (rules, regulations) are properly exercised |
| Committee on Government Assurances | — | — | Whether ministers’ promises on the floor are implemented |
| Committee on Petitions | — | — | Petitions on bills and matters of public importance |
2.4 Limits of legislative control
- Executive dominance through a majority and party discipline (the Tenth Schedule, 1985, punishes defiance of the whip).
- Frequent disruptions; shrinking number of sitting days; budgets passed by guillotine without discussion of most demands.
- Committee reports are recommendatory; follow-up through “action taken reports” is slow.
- Technical complexity and an information gap between ministries and members.
- Growing use of ordinances and of Money Bill certification for laws that the Rajya Sabha could otherwise amend.
3. Executive (Administrative) and Budgetary Control
Within the executive, control runs from the political head to the bureaucracy and down the hierarchy.
| Mechanism | How it works |
|---|---|
| Ministerial control | The minister is answerable to Parliament for the department (ministerial responsibility); the secretary is the administrative head |
| Hierarchy and supervision | Span of control, inspections, annual performance appraisal, disciplinary rules (All India Services (Conduct) Rules, Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules) |
| Budgetary and financial control | Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) sanctions; Integrated Financial Advisers in ministries; re-appropriation rules; the Controller General of Accounts maintains accounts |
| Delegated legislation control | Rules must be laid before Parliament |
| Recruitment and service control | UPSC (Arts. 315–323), DoPT, Central Administrative Tribunal (Art. 323A; Administrative Tribunals Act 1985) |
| Performance monitoring | Results-Framework Documents (RFD, from 2009); now dashboards, PRAGATI reviews and the Output-Outcome Monitoring Framework (see monitoring and evaluation) |
| Vigilance | Chief Vigilance Officers in each ministry and PSU, under the CVC’s superintendence |
Budgeting techniques as tools of control: line-item budgeting (control of inputs), performance budgeting (activities and results; associated in the USA with the first Hoover Commission, 1949), planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) (programme choice; US Defense Department, 1960s), zero-based budgeting (every expenditure justified afresh; associated with Peter Pyhrr), and outcome budgeting (India, 2005–06).
4. Judicial Control over the Legislature and Executive
4.1 Judicial review
- Basis: Art. 13 (laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void), Art. 32 (Supreme Court; Ambedkar called it “the very soul” and “the heart” of the Constitution), Art. 226 (High Courts; wider, “for any other purpose”), Arts. 131–136.
- Over the legislature: laws tested for legislative competence (Seventh Schedule), violation of Fundamental Rights and, for constitutional amendments, the basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973). Judicial review itself is part of the basic structure (Minerva Mills, 1980; L. Chandra Kumar, 1997).
- Over the executive: administrative action reviewed on the grounds stated by Lord Diplock in the GCHQ case (1984): illegality, irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness, 1948) and procedural impropriety (natural justice: audi alteram partem, nemo judex in causa sua). Proportionality has been added in rights cases.
4.2 The five writs
| Writ | Literal meaning | Issued to | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Habeas corpus | “You may have the body” | Any authority or private person detaining someone | Produce the detained person and justify the detention |
| Mandamus | “We command” | Public authority (not the President, Governor or a private person) | Perform a public duty it has failed to perform |
| Prohibition | “To forbid” | Lower courts and tribunals | Stop proceedings in excess of jurisdiction (before decision) |
| Certiorari | “To be certified / informed” | Lower courts, tribunals and (now) administrative authorities | Quash an order made without or in excess of jurisdiction (after decision) |
| Quo warranto | “By what authority?” | Holder of a public office | Justify the claim to the office |
4.3 Judicial activism and public interest litigation
PIL relaxed locus standi so that any public-spirited person could approach the court for those unable to do so (S.P. Gupta v Union of India, 1981, the Judges’ Transfer case; Hussainara Khatoon on undertrial prisoners, 1979). Landmark governance cases:
| Case | Year | Governance significance |
|---|---|---|
| Vineet Narain v Union of India (Jain hawala case) | 1997 (judgment December 1997) | Directions to give the CVC statutory status and insulate the CBI; “continuing mandamus” |
| Vishaka v State of Rajasthan | 1997 | Guidelines on sexual harassment at the workplace, filling a legislative gap |
| PUCL v Union of India (right to food) | from 2001 | Interim orders turning mid-day meals and PDS entitlements into legal rights |
| Prakash Singh v Union of India | 2006 | Directions on police reform |
| T.S.R. Subramanian v Union of India | 2013 | Fixed tenure for civil servants; civil services boards; recorded oral instructions |
Limits: judicial overreach and the separation of powers; delays and pendency; courts lack capacity to administer; Art. 122 bars review of internal parliamentary proceedings.
5. Administrative Culture
Administrative culture is the set of values, attitudes and behaviour patterns of officials: how they see their role, citizens, rules and politicians.
| Feature of Indian administrative culture | Source / explanation |
|---|---|
| Rule-orientation, red tape, proceduralism | Colonial “steel frame” built for revenue and order, not development; fear of audit and vigilance |
| Hierarchy and status consciousness | Generalist elite services; social hierarchy carried into office |
| Secrecy | Official Secrets Act, 1923; the culture RTI was meant to reverse |
| Formalism | Fred Riggs’s “prismatic society” (Administration in Developing Countries, 1964): a gap between formal norms and actual behaviour; the office as sala |
| Politicisation | Transfers as punishment, patronage; Supreme Court’s T.S.R. Subramanian (2013) on fixed tenure |
| Low citizen orientation | Citizen as supplicant; hence citizen’s charters and right-to-services laws |
Reform aims to move from “rule-bound” to “result-oriented” and citizen-centric administration: the theme of the Second ARC’s 12th report and of Mission Karmayogi (2020).
6. Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Framework
Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. Robert Klitgaard’s formula (Controlling Corruption, 1988) is a favourite way to explain it:
$$\text{Corruption} = \text{Monopoly} + \text{Discretion} - \text{Accountability}$$6.1 Institutions and laws, in order
timeline
title Anti-corruption framework in India
1946 : Delhi Special Police Establishment Act
1962-64 : Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption
1963 : CBI set up by Home Ministry resolution
1964 : Central Vigilance Commission (executive resolution)
1966 : First ARC interim report recommends Lokpal and Lokayukta
1988 : Prevention of Corruption Act
2003 : CVC Act gives statutory status
2005 : Right to Information Act
2011 : India ratifies UN Convention against Corruption
2013 : Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act (in force January 2014)
2014 : Whistle Blowers Protection Act
2018 : Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act| Body / law | Key points |
|---|---|
| Santhanam Committee (K. Santhanam, 1962–64) | Recommended the CVC; noted that corruption had spread to ministers; suggested a code of conduct for ministers |
| CBI (1963) | Derives investigative powers from the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; needs state consent to investigate in a state (Section 6) |
| CVC (1964; statutory 2003) | Central Vigilance Commissioner + up to two Vigilance Commissioners; selected by a committee of the PM, Home Minister and Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha; superintends vigilance and CBI investigations under the PC Act; advisory, not prosecuting |
| Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 | Replaced the 1947 Act; “public servant” widely defined |
| PC (Amendment) Act, 2018 | Made giving a bribe a specific offence; Section 17A: prior approval needed before inquiring into a public servant’s decisions in official functions; time limit for trial |
| Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 | Protection to persons disclosing corruption; complaints to the CVC |
| UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) | Adopted 2003; India ratified in 2011 |
| Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 | Ombudsman for the Union and states; see the grievance redress page |
7. Administrative Reforms
| Landmark | Year | Key content |
|---|---|---|
| A.D. Gorwala, Report on Public Administration | 1951 | Integrity and efficiency; probity in public life |
| Paul H. Appleby, Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey | 1953 (second report 1956) | Called Indian administration among the most advanced but hampered by excessive procedure; recommended an O&M organisation and the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA, 1954) |
| Santhanam Committee | 1962–64 | Corruption → CVC |
| First Administrative Reforms Commission | Set up 5 January 1966; chaired by Morarji Desai, then K. Hanumanthaiya | 20 reports; its interim report (1966) on redress of citizens’ grievances recommended Lokpal and Lokayukta; also personnel administration, Centre–state relations; led to the Department of Personnel (1970) |
| Department of Administrative Reforms | 1964 onwards (now DARPG) | Nodal body for reforms and grievances |
| Chief Ministers’ Conference on effective and responsive administration | 1997 | Action plan: citizen’s charters, transparency, RTI, people’s participation |
| Fifth Central Pay Commission | 1997 | Downsizing, performance-linked pay |
| Second Administrative Reforms Commission | Set up 31 August 2005; chaired by M. Veerappa Moily | 15 reports (2006–2009) |
| Lateral entry at joint secretary level | From 2018 | Specialists from outside the services |
| Mission Karmayogi | 2020 | National Programme for Civil Services Capacity Building; iGOT Karmayogi platform |
Second ARC: the reports most asked
| Report no. | Title |
|---|---|
| 1st | Right to Information: Master Key to Good Governance |
| 2nd | Unlocking Human Capital: Entitlements and Governance — a Case Study (on NREGA) |
| 4th | Ethics in Governance |
| 6th | Local Governance |
| 10th | Refurbishing of Personnel Administration |
| 11th | Promoting e-Governance: The Smart Way Forward |
| 12th | Citizen Centric Administration: The Heart of Governance |
| 15th | State and District Administration |
Memory Tricks
Don’t Confuse
| This | vs | That |
|---|---|---|
| PAC — post-mortem of spending; CAG reports; 15 LS + 7 RS | vs | Estimates Committee — economy in estimates; 30 LS only |
| Adjournment motion — urgent matter, Lok Sabha only, censure element | vs | Calling attention motion — minister’s statement, Indian innovation |
| No-confidence — no reasons needed; ministry must resign | vs | Censure — reasons required; no automatic resignation |
| Prohibition — before the decision | vs | Certiorari — quashes after the decision |
| First ARC (1966; Morarji Desai, then Hanumanthaiya; 20 reports) | vs | Second ARC (2005; Veerappa Moily; 15 reports) |
| CVC — vigilance, advisory, statutory 2003 | vs | CBI — investigation under DSPE Act 1946, set up 1963 |
| Santhanam Committee (1962–64) → CVC | vs | L.M. Singhvi — coined “Lokpal” (1963) |
Common Mistakes
Practice
All questions below are original practice questions written in the UGC NET format. They are not previous-year questions.
Level 1: Foundation
- How many members does the Estimates Committee have, and from which House?
- Which writ means “by what authority”?
- Who chaired the Second Administrative Reforms Commission when it was set up in 2005?
Answers
- 30, all from the Lok Sabha.
- Quo warranto.
- M. Veerappa Moily.
Level 2: Exam-style MCQs
Q1. (Practice) A member moves to reduce a demand for grant by Rs 100 to ventilate a specific grievance. This is a:
- (a) policy cut
- (b) economy cut
- (c) token cut
- (d) guillotine
Answer and explanation
(c) Token cut. A policy cut reduces the demand to Re 1; an economy cut reduces it by a specified amount; the guillotine puts all remaining demands to vote without discussion.
Q2. (Practice) Consider the following statements about the Public Accounts Committee:
- It has 22 members, 15 from the Lok Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha.
- By convention since 1967 its chairperson is from the opposition.
- It examines the budget estimates before the demands for grants are voted.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 only
- (b) 1 and 2 only
- (c) 2 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation
(b). Statement 3 is wrong: the PAC examines appropriation accounts and CAG reports after expenditure.
Q3. (Practice) The Central Vigilance Commission was given statutory status in:
- (a) 1964
- (b) 1988
- (c) 2003
- (d) 2013
Answer and explanation
(c) 2003, by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, following the Supreme Court’s directions in Vineet Narain. 1964 is when it was set up by executive resolution.
Q4. (Practice) Which pair is incorrectly matched?
- (a) Art. 114 — Appropriation Bill
- (b) Art. 151 — Reports of the CAG
- (c) Art. 116 — Annual Financial Statement
- (d) Art. 265 — No tax except by authority of law
Answer and explanation
(c). Art. 116 deals with votes on account, votes of credit and exceptional grants. The Annual Financial Statement is Art. 112.
Level 3: Assertion–reason, match and sequence
For assertion–reason questions, use these options:
- (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
- (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
- (c) A is true, but R is false
- (d) A is false, but R is true
Q1. (Practice) Assertion (A): Parliamentary committees are often more effective than the floor of the House in controlling the administration. Reason (R): Committees work continuously, in detail and in a less partisan atmosphere, and can examine officials.
Answer and explanation
(a). R explains why committees supplement floor control.
Q2. (Practice) Assertion (A): India follows a strict separation of powers on the American model. Reason (R): Courts in India cannot inquire into the validity of proceedings in Parliament on the ground of irregularity of procedure.
Answer and explanation
(d). A is false: India has a parliamentary system with functional separation and checks and balances. R is true (Art. 122) but does not make A true.
Q3. (Practice) Match List I (Writ) with List II (Purpose).
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. Habeas corpus | I. Command a public authority to perform a duty |
| B. Mandamus | II. Quash an order passed in excess of jurisdiction |
| C. Certiorari | III. Inquire into the legality of a claim to public office |
| D. Quo warranto | IV. Produce a detained person |
- (a) A-IV, B-I, C-II, D-III
- (b) A-IV, B-II, C-I, D-III
- (c) A-I, B-IV, C-II, D-III
- (d) A-IV, B-I, C-III, D-II
Answer and explanation
(a) A-IV, B-I, C-II, D-III.
Q4. (Practice) Arrange in chronological order:
- Central Vigilance Commission set up by resolution
- Prevention of Corruption Act
- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act
- Whistle Blowers Protection Act
- (a) 3, 1, 2, 4
- (b) 1, 3, 2, 4
- (c) 3, 2, 1, 4
- (d) 3, 1, 4, 2
Answer and explanation
(a). 1946 → 1964 → 1988 → 2014.
Q5. (Practice) Match List I (Report) with List II (Author/Body).
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. Report on Public Administration (1951) | I. Second ARC |
| B. Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey (1953) | II. A.D. Gorwala |
| C. Ethics in Governance | III. Paul H. Appleby |
| D. Report recommending Lokpal and Lokayukta (1966) | IV. First ARC |
- (a) A-II, B-III, C-I, D-IV
- (b) A-III, B-II, C-I, D-IV
- (c) A-II, B-III, C-IV, D-I
- (d) A-II, B-I, C-III, D-IV
Answer and explanation
(a) A-II, B-III, C-I, D-IV.
Quick Revision Table
| Item | Key point |
|---|---|
| Separation of powers | Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748; India: checks and balances |
| Adjournment / no-confidence | 50 members; Lok Sabha only |
| Cut motions | Policy → Re 1; economy → specified amount; token → Rs 100 |
| Finance articles | 112 AFS; 113 demands; 114 Appropriation; 116 vote on account; 110 Money Bill; 265 tax by law |
| CAG | Arts. 148–151; Act of 1971; reports to President |
| PAC | 22 (15 + 7); 1921; opposition chair since 1967 |
| Estimates Committee | 30, all LS; 1950; “continuous economy committee” |
| COPU | 22 (15 + 7); 1964 |
| DRSCs | 1993; now 24; 31 members each (21 + 10) |
| Judicial review | Arts. 13, 32, 226; Kesavananda 1973; Minerva Mills 1980; L. Chandra Kumar 1997 |
| GCHQ grounds | Illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety |
| Prismatic society | Fred Riggs, 1964 |
| CBI / CVC | 1963 / 1964 (statutory 2003) |
| PC Act | 1988; amended 2018 (bribe-giving, Sec. 17A) |
| First ARC | 1966; Morarji Desai → Hanumanthaiya; 20 reports |
| Second ARC | 2005; Veerappa Moily; 15 reports |
| Mission Karmayogi | 2020 |
Key Takeaways
What’s Next
- RTI, Consumer Protection, Citizen’s Charter and Lokpal — the institutional mechanisms for good governance
- Meaning, Evolution and Approaches of Public Administration — Riggs’s ecological approach in full
- Policies, Governance and Administration of Higher Education (Paper 1) — regulatory bodies and their accountability in one sector
- Governance and Public Policy — Quick Revision