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Political Regimes and Constitutionalism

Democratic and non-democratic regimes, from liberal democracy to fascism, plus constitutions, rule of law, judicial independence and emergency powers.

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  • Updated
On this page · 11 sections
  1. Prerequisites
  2. The Hook: A Constitution That Allowed Its Own Death
  3. Part A: Political Regimes
  4. Part B: Constitutions and Constitutionalism
  5. Memory Tricks
  6. Don’t Confuse
  7. Common Mistakes
  8. Practice
  9. Quick Revision Table
  10. Key Takeaways
  11. What’s Next

Prerequisites

The Hook: A Constitution That Allowed Its Own Death

How UGC NET asks it: classify a regime from its features; match O’Donnell, Linz, Arendt, Friedrich and Brzezinski, and Finer to their concepts; Dicey’s three meanings of the rule of law; Loewenstein’s normative, nominal and semantic constitutions; Schmitt on the exception; India’s emergency provisions and the 44th Amendment.


Part A: Political Regimes

A regime is the set of rules, formal and informal, that decides who holds power, how they get it and how they may use it. Governments change often; regimes change rarely.

1. Classifying regimes

graph TD
    R["Political regimes"] --> D["Democratic"]
    R --> H["Hybrid
competitive / electoral
authoritarianism"] R --> N["Non-democratic"] D --> D1["Electoral"] D --> D2["Liberal"] D --> D3["Majoritarian
(vs consensus)"] D --> D4["Participatory"] N --> N1["Traditional / patrimonial
and sultanistic"] N --> N2["Authoritarian:
bureaucratic-authoritarian,
military, one-party"] N --> N3["Totalitarian:
fascist, Nazi, Stalinist"]

Juan Linz separated authoritarian from totalitarian regimes in “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain” (1964). Authoritarian regimes have:

  1. Limited, not responsible, political pluralism (some groups tolerated, but not accountable to voters);
  2. No elaborate guiding ideology, only distinctive mentalities;
  3. No intensive or extensive political mobilisation (except at some points);
  4. A leader or small group exercising power within formally ill-defined but predictable limits.

Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (1996), added post-totalitarian and sultanistic types, giving five ideal types with democracy.

2. Democratic regimes

TypeDefining featuresThinkers / examples
Electoral democracyRegular, competitive, reasonably free elections with universal suffrage; little else guaranteedSchumpeter’s minimal definition (1942); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy (1999), separates electoral from liberal democracy
Liberal democracyElections plus constitutional limits, rule of law, independent courts, civil liberties, minority rights, free media, civilian control of the militaryDahl’s polyarchy; Fukuyama’s “end of history” (1989/1992)
Majoritarian democracyPower concentrated in the majority: single-party cabinets, two-party system, plurality elections, unitary centralised government, flexible constitution, parliamentary sovereigntyArend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (1999): the Westminster model (UK, New Zealand before 1996) vs consensus model (Switzerland, Belgium)
Participatory democracyCitizens take part directly in decisions beyond voting: workplaces, neighbourhoods, budgetingCarole Pateman (1970); C.B. Macpherson (1977); participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil (from 1989); India’s gram sabhas under the 73rd Amendment (1992)

Dahl’s six institutions of modern representative democracy (polyarchy) (Democracy and Its Critics, 1989): elected officials; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; inclusive citizenship.

Lijphart’s ten contrasts (in two dimensions)

DimensionMajoritarian (Westminster)Consensus
Executives–partiesSingle-party majority cabinetsBroad multiparty coalitions
Executive dominance over legislatureExecutive–legislative balance
Two-party systemMultiparty system
Majoritarian, disproportional electionsProportional representation
Pluralist interest groupsCorporatist interest groups
Federal–unitaryUnitary, centralised governmentFederal, decentralised
Unicameral (or asymmetric) legislatureStrong bicameralism
Flexible constitutionRigid constitution
No judicial review (legislative supremacy)Judicial review
Central bank dependent on executiveIndependent central bank

Diminished subtypes (“democracy with adjectives”): David Collier and Steven Levitsky (World Politics, 1997) listed hundreds of qualified democracies. Common ones: illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997), delegative democracy (Guillermo O’Donnell, 1994: a president elected by majority governs as he sees fit, with weak horizontal accountability), and the hybrid regimes below.

3. Hybrid regimes

TypeMeaningSource
Competitive authoritarianismFormal democratic institutions are the main route to power, but incumbents abuse state resources so badly that competition is real but unfairSteven Levitsky and Lucan Way (article 2002; book 2010)
Electoral authoritarianismElections held regularly but under conditions that deny genuine choiceAndreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism (2006)

4. Non-democratic regimes

(a) Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism and sultanism

  • Patrimonialism (Max Weber): a form of traditional domination in which the ruler treats the state as his personal household; officials are personal dependants; no separation of public and private.
  • Neo-patrimonialism: patrimonial practices inside a modern, legal-rational state shell. S.N. Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism (1973); Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (1997): presidentialism, clientelism and use of state resources for patronage.
  • Sultanism: Weber’s extreme form of patrimonialism, rule by the ruler’s personal discretion; developed by H.E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, Sultanistic Regimes (1998). Examples: Trujillo (Dominican Republic), the Somozas (Nicaragua), the Duvaliers (Haiti), Marcos (Philippines).

(b) Bureaucratic authoritarianism

Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (1973), studied Brazil (from 1964) and Argentina (from 1966); the concept was later applied to Chile and Uruguay (1973).

FeatureDetail
RulersTechnocrats from large bureaucratic organisations: the armed forces, the state, big firms
ExclusionPolitical exclusion of the popular sector (unions, populist parties) and economic exclusion (wage repression)
DepoliticisationSocial questions treated as technical problems
Economic project“Deepening” industrialisation from consumer goods to intermediate and capital goods after the “easy” phase of import substitution was exhausted
AlliesInternational capital and the local upper bourgeoisie

(c) Military dictatorship

ThinkerWork (year)Contribution
Samuel HuntingtonThe Soldier and the State (1957)Objective civilian control (a professional, politically neutral military) vs subjective control (civilians maximise their own power over the military)
S.E. FinerThe Man on Horseback (1962)Levels of military intervention: influence → pressure (blackmail) → displacement → supplantment; intervention likeliest where political culture is low or minimal
Morris JanowitzThe Military in the Political Development of New Nations (1964)The military’s organisational traits in new states
Samuel HuntingtonPolitical Order in Changing Societies (1968)Praetorianism: when political participation outruns institutionalisation, all groups, including the army, act directly
Eric NordlingerSoldiers in Politics (1977)Military moderators, guardians and rulers

Examples: Pakistan (1958, 1977, 1999), Chile (Pinochet, 1973–90), Myanmar (1962; coup of February 2021), Thailand (2006, 2014), Egypt (2013).

(d) Totalitarianism

The word was first used critically by Italian opponents of Mussolini in the early 1920s and then adopted by the Fascists themselves.

  • Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951): three parts — antisemitism, imperialism, totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is a new form of government based on ideology and terror, the mobilisation of atomised masses, and the concentration camp as its laboratory. She treated Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR as its two cases.
  • Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956): the six-point syndrome:
    1. An official, all-embracing ideology;
    2. A single mass party, typically led by one man;
    3. A system of terroristic police control;
    4. A near-monopoly of mass communications;
    5. A near-monopoly of weapons;
    6. Central control and direction of the economy.
  • J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1952), traced a “totalitarian democracy” to Rousseau and the Jacobins; Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), to Plato, Hegel and Marx.

Critiques: the model is static and Cold War in origin; it could not explain change after Stalin (hence Linz and Stepan’s “post-totalitarian”); it lumps very different ideologies together.

(e) Fascism

ItemDetail
ItalyMussolini’s March on Rome (October 1922); “The Doctrine of Fascism” (1932, written with Giovanni Gentile); the formula “everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state”
GermanyHitler appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933; Enabling Act (March 1933); Nazism added biological racism and Lebensraum
Core featuresUltranationalism and the myth of national rebirth; the leader principle; a single mass party with paramilitary violence; anti-liberalism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarism; corporatism (state-organised capital and labour); militarism and the cult of action
DefinitionsErnst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (1963): Action Française, Italian Fascism, Nazism; Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (1991): “palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism”; Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (2004): fascism as stages of a political process

Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal are usually classed as authoritarian (Linz’s Spain article was built on Franco’s regime), not fully fascist or totalitarian.


Part B: Constitutions and Constitutionalism

5. Forms of constitutions

BasisTypesNotes
FormWritten (codified) vs unwritten (uncodified)UK, New Zealand and Israel have no single codified document; the US (1787) and India (1950) do
Amendment procedureRigid vs flexibleJames Bryce, “Flexible and Rigid Constitutions” (in Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 1901); India is partly rigid, partly flexible (Article 368 and simple-majority provisions)
Distribution of powerFederal vs unitaryK.C. Wheare, Federal Government (1946), Modern Constitutions (1951); Wheare called India “quasi-federal”
Executive–legislature relationParliamentary vs presidential (and semi-presidential)Maurice Duverger popularised “semi-presidential” for systems like the French Fifth Republic (1958 constitution)
Head of stateMonarchical vs republican
Working reality (Loewenstein)Normative, nominal, semanticSee below

Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process (1957), classified constitutions by how far they actually govern power:

TypeMeaningHis image
NormativeThe constitution really governs the power processA suit that fits and is actually worn
NominalNot yet fully operative because social and economic conditions lag; educational purposeA suit kept in the wardrobe until the body grows into it
SemanticMerely formalises the existing power of the rulersNot a suit at all, but a masquerade costume

Giovanni Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (APSR, 1962), similarly separated garantiste (true, rights-protecting) constitutions from nominal and façade constitutions.

6. Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism is the idea, and the practice, of limited government: power is created, divided and restrained by fundamental law.

  • C.H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (1940): constitutionalism has one essential quality — “a legal limitation on government”; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule.
  • Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (1791–92): a constitution is not the act of a government but of a people constituting a government.

Liberal constitutionalism — the elements

ElementSource
Government by consent; natural rightsLocke, Two Treatises (1689)
Separation of powersMontesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748)
Checks and balancesMadison, Federalist No. 51 (1788): “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”
Judicial reviewMarbury v. Madison (1803), US Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall
Bill of rightsUS Bill of Rights (1791); Part III of the Indian Constitution
FederalismUS (1787), Canada, Australia, India
Rule of lawDicey (below)

Critiques of liberal constitutionalism

CritiqueArgument
MarxistConstitutions protect property and class power behind formal equality
Political constitutionalismRichard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (2007); Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review” (2006): rights disagreements should be settled by elected legislatures, not unelected judges
JuristocracyRan Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (2004): elites shift power to courts to protect their interests
Feminist / postcolonialThe public–private divide and imported Western models

7. Rule of law

A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), gave three meanings:

  1. Supremacy of regular law — no one can be punished except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary courts; the absence of arbitrary power and of wide discretionary authority.
  2. Equality before the law — every person, official or private, is subject to the ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts (Dicey contrasted this with France’s separate droit administratif).
  3. The constitution as the result of ordinary law — in England, rights come from judicial decisions in particular cases, not from a written declaration.

Later formulations

  • Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964): eight principles of the “inner morality of law”, illustrated by King Rex’s eight failures — laws must be general, publicly promulgated, prospective (not retroactive), clear, non-contradictory, possible to obey, relatively constant, and applied as announced (congruence between official action and declared rule).
  • F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944): government bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand.
  • Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” (1977): a formal ideal, not the same as good law.
  • Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010): eight principles, including protection of human rights.
  • Rule by law vs rule of law: using law as an instrument of power (rule by law) is not the same as subjecting power to law (rule of law).

In India, the rule of law is part of the basic structure of the Constitution (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973, and later cases); Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

8. Judicial independence

SafeguardExample
Security of tenureEngland’s Act of Settlement (1701): judges hold office during good behaviour, removable only on an address of both Houses
TheoryMontesquieu (1748): no liberty if the judicial power is not separated from the legislative and executive; Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 (1788): the judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch, with “neither force nor will, but merely judgment”
Financial securitySalaries not reducible to the judges’ disadvantage; in India judges’ salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund
AppointmentIndia: the collegium system from the Second Judges case (1993); the National Judicial Appointments Commission (99th Amendment, 2014) was struck down in the Fourth Judges case (2015)
Separation from the executiveIndian Article 50 (Directive Principle)
International standardBangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002): independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, competence and diligence

9. Emergency powers and the crisis of constitutionalism

Thinker / sourceIdea
Roman RepublicA dictator appointed for a limited term (six months) to meet a crisis, then power returned
John LockePrerogative: power to act for the public good without the prescription of law, and sometimes against it (Second Treatise)
Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship (1921)Commissarial dictatorship (suspends the constitution to restore it) vs sovereign dictatorship (creates a new order)
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (1922)“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”
Weimar Article 48Presidential emergency decrees; heavily used in the early 1930s
Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (1948)Democracies need crisis government, with safeguards: temporary, legally declared, aimed at restoring normality
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Italian 2003)The exception has become the normal paradigm of government; links to post-2001 security laws

India’s emergency provisions (Part XVIII)

ArticleEmergencyKey points
352National emergencyGrounds: war, external aggression or armed rebellion (“internal disturbance” until the 44th Amendment, 1978); proclaimed in 1962, 1971 and 25 June 1975 (on internal disturbance; ended March 1977)
356Failure of constitutional machinery in a state (President’s Rule)Limited by S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): proclamation subject to judicial review; floor test
360Financial emergencyNever proclaimed

44th Amendment (1978) safeguards: proclamation only on the written advice of the Union Cabinet; approval by each House by special majority within one month; Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended even during an emergency. In ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) the Supreme Court had held that the right to move courts for enforcement of Article 21 could be suspended; that view was expressly overruled in K.S. Puttaswamy (2017).

The contemporary crisis of constitutionalism

ConceptAuthorMeaning
Constitutional hardballMark Tushnet (2004)Moves that are technically legal but break unwritten conventions
Abusive constitutionalismDavid Landau (2013)Using constitutional amendment and replacement to erode democracy
Executive aggrandisementNancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding” (2016)Elected executives weaken checks step by step, rather than by coups
Autocratic legalismKim Lane Scheppele (2018)Legal mandates used to dismantle constitutional limits
Guardrails of democracySteven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018)Mutual toleration and institutional forbearance

Memory Tricks

Don’t Confuse

ThisvsThat
Authoritarian — limited pluralism, mentalities (Linz 1964)vsTotalitarian — no pluralism, ideology, mobilisation
Bureaucratic authoritarianism — O’Donnell (1973)vsDelegative democracy — O’Donnell (1994)
Patrimonialism — Weber, traditionalvsNeo-patrimonialism — patrimonial practice in a modern state
Arendt — ideology and terror (1951)vsFriedrich and Brzezinski — six-point syndrome (1956)
Huntington 1957 — objective vs subjective controlvsHuntington 1968 — praetorianism, political decay
Lijphart majoritarian — institutional designvsMajoritarianism — majority community dominance
Loewenstein — normative, nominal, semanticvsSartori — garantiste, nominal, façade
Schmitt 1921 — commissarial vs sovereign dictatorshipvsSchmitt 1922 — sovereign decides on the exception
Article 352 — national emergencyvsArticle 356 — President’s Rule in a state

Common Mistakes


Practice

All questions below are original practice questions written in the UGC NET format. They are not previous-year questions.

Level 1: Foundation

  1. Who wrote Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (1973)?
  2. Which three meanings did Dicey give to the rule of law?
  3. Which Indian constitutional amendment replaced “internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion” in Article 352?
Answers
  1. Guillermo O’Donnell.
  2. Supremacy of regular law (absence of arbitrary power), equality before the law, and the constitution as the result of the ordinary law of the land.
  3. The 44th Amendment (1978).

Level 2: Exam-style MCQs

Q1. (Practice) Which of the following is not among the six features of totalitarian dictatorship identified by Friedrich and Brzezinski?

  • (a) A single mass party
  • (b) Terroristic police control
  • (c) Limited, not responsible, political pluralism
  • (d) Central direction of the economy
Answer and explanation

(c). Limited, non-responsible pluralism is Linz’s mark of an authoritarian regime, which is precisely what distinguishes it from totalitarianism.

Q2. (Practice) Consider the following statements about Lijphart’s majoritarian (Westminster) model:

  1. It tends to have single-party majority cabinets.
  2. It typically has a rigid constitution protected by judicial review.
  3. It is associated with plurality electoral systems and a two-party system.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  • (a) 1 and 2 only
  • (b) 1 and 3 only
  • (c) 2 and 3 only
  • (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation

(b) 1 and 3 only. The Westminster model has a flexible constitution and parliamentary sovereignty; rigid constitutions with judicial review belong to the consensus model.

Q3. (Practice) “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” The author of this statement is:

  • (a) Giorgio Agamben
  • (b) Carl Schmitt
  • (c) Clinton Rossiter
  • (d) Hans Kelsen
Answer and explanation

(b) Carl Schmitt, opening line of Political Theology (1922). Agamben built on it in State of Exception.

Q4. (Practice) In Karl Loewenstein’s classification, a constitution that merely formalises the existing distribution of power for the benefit of the rulers is called:

  • (a) Normative
  • (b) Nominal
  • (c) Semantic
  • (d) Garantiste
Answer and explanation

(c) Semantic — “a masquerade costume”. Garantiste is Sartori’s term for a genuine rights-protecting constitution.

Level 3: Assertion–reason, match and sequence

For assertion–reason questions, use these options:

  • (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
  • (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
  • (c) A is true, but R is false
  • (d) A is false, but R is true

Q1. (Practice) Assertion (A): O’Donnell’s study of bureaucratic authoritarianism challenged modernisation theory. Reason (R): He found new authoritarian regimes emerging in the more economically advanced countries of South America.

Answer and explanation

(a). Modernisation theory predicted that development would favour democracy; O’Donnell’s finding reversed that expectation.

Q2. (Practice) Assertion (A): Hamilton described the judiciary as the least dangerous branch of government. Reason (R): The judiciary controls neither the sword nor the purse and has merely judgment.

Answer and explanation

(a). Federalist No. 78: the judiciary has “neither force nor will, but merely judgment”, which is why it is least dangerous to political rights.

Q3. (Practice) Match List I (Thinker) with List II (Concept).

List IList II
A. S.E. FinerI. Palingenetic ultranationalism
B. Roger GriffinII. Delegative democracy
C. Guillermo O’DonnellIII. Levels of military intervention
D. Fareed ZakariaIV. Illiberal democracy
  • (a) A-III, B-I, C-II, D-IV
  • (b) A-I, B-III, C-II, D-IV
  • (c) A-III, B-I, C-IV, D-II
  • (d) A-III, B-II, C-I, D-IV
Answer and explanation

(a) A-III, B-I, C-II, D-IV. Finer, The Man on Horseback (1962); Griffin (1991); O’Donnell (1994); Zakaria (1997).

Q4. (Practice) Arrange the following in chronological order:

  1. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws
  2. Act of Settlement (England)
  3. Marbury v. Madison
  4. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
  • (a) 2, 1, 3, 4
  • (b) 1, 2, 3, 4
  • (c) 2, 3, 1, 4
  • (d) 1, 3, 2, 4
Answer and explanation

(a). Act of Settlement 1701 → Montesquieu 1748 → Marbury 1803 → Dicey 1885.

Q5. (Practice) Arrange Finer’s levels of military intervention from the least to the most direct:

  1. Displacement
  2. Influence
  3. Supplantment
  4. Pressure (blackmail)
  • (a) 2, 4, 1, 3
  • (b) 4, 2, 1, 3
  • (c) 2, 1, 4, 3
  • (d) 2, 4, 3, 1
Answer and explanation

(a). Influence → pressure → displacement (replacing one civilian government with another) → supplantment (the military replaces civilian rule altogether).


Quick Revision Table

Thinker / sourceWorkYearKey idea
Act of Settlement—1701Judicial tenure during good behaviour
MontesquieuThe Spirit of the Laws1748Separation of powers
HamiltonFederalist No. 781788Least dangerous branch
Marbury v. MadisonUS Supreme Court1803Judicial review
DiceyLaw of the Constitution1885Three meanings of rule of law
Bryce“Flexible and Rigid Constitutions”1901Rigid vs flexible
SchmittPolitical Theology1922Sovereign decides on the exception
McIlwainConstitutionalism: Ancient and Modern1940Legal limitation on government
RossiterConstitutional Dictatorship1948Crisis government with safeguards
ArendtThe Origins of Totalitarianism1951Ideology and terror
Friedrich and BrzezinskiTotalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy1956Six-point syndrome
HuntingtonThe Soldier and the State1957Objective vs subjective control
LoewensteinPolitical Power and the Governmental Process1957Normative, nominal, semantic
FinerThe Man on Horseback1962Four levels of intervention
Linz“An Authoritarian Regime: Spain”1964Authoritarian vs totalitarian
FullerThe Morality of Law1964Eight principles
HuntingtonPolitical Order in Changing Societies1968Praetorianism
O’DonnellModernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism1973BA regimes in South America
EisenstadtTraditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism1973Neo-patrimonialism
GriffinThe Nature of Fascism1991Palingenetic ultranationalism
O’Donnell“Delegative Democracy”1994Weak horizontal accountability
Zakaria“The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”1997Illiberal democracy
LijphartPatterns of Democracy1999Majoritarian vs consensus
Levitsky and Way“The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”2002Hybrid regime
Levitsky and ZiblattHow Democracies Die2018Toleration and forbearance

Key Takeaways

What’s Next

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