Actors and Processes
Electoral systems, parties and party systems, interest groups, social movements, NGOs and civil society campaigns, and revolutions for UGC NET.
- 22 min
On this page · 14 sections
- Prerequisites
- The Hook: Same Votes, Different Parliaments
- Part A: Electoral Systems
- Part B: Political Parties and Party Systems
- Part C: Interest Groups
- Part D: Social Movements, New Social Movements, NGOs and Civil Society
- Part E: Revolutions
- Memory Tricks
- Don’t Confuse
- Common Mistakes
- Practice
- Quick Revision Table
- Key Takeaways
- What’s Next
Prerequisites
- Political Regimes and Constitutionalism — Lijphart’s majoritarian and consensus models, which rest on electoral and party systems.
- Democracy and Power — pluralism, Michels’s iron law and the three faces of power.
- Fractions, Ratio, Percentage and Averages — the arithmetic behind seat allocation and vote shares.
The Hook: Same Votes, Different Parliaments
How UGC NET asks it: match electoral systems to countries; Duverger’s law and its exceptions; Sartori’s seven party systems; Kirchheimer, Duverger, Katz and Mair on party types; Lipset and Rokkan’s four cleavages; Almond and Powell’s four interest groups; Olson’s free rider; resource mobilisation vs political opportunity vs NSM theory; Skocpol vs Davies vs Brinton on revolutions.
Part A: Electoral Systems
1. The three families
| Family | System | How it works | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plurality / majority | First-past-the-post (FPTP) / single-member plurality | Candidate with the most votes in a single-member constituency wins | UK House of Commons, Lok Sabha, US House, Canada |
| Two-round system | Second round if no candidate wins a majority in the first | French presidential and National Assembly elections | |
| Alternative vote (AV) / preferential | Voters rank candidates; lowest eliminated and preferences transferred until one has a majority | Australian House of Representatives | |
| Proportional representation (PR) | List PR | Parties win seats in proportion to votes; closed lists (party orders candidates) or open lists (voters influence order) | Israel (closed list, one nationwide constituency); the Netherlands (nationwide, with preference votes for candidates); South Africa (closed) |
| Single transferable vote (STV) | Multi-member constituencies; voters rank candidates; candidates need a quota; surpluses and eliminated candidates’ votes transferred | Ireland (Dáil), Malta, Australian Senate; in India, the President, Vice-President and Rajya Sabha members are elected by PR through STV | |
| Mixed | Mixed-member proportional (MMP) | Constituency seats plus list seats that compensate to make the overall result proportional | Germany, New Zealand (since 1996) |
| Parallel (mixed-member majoritarian) | Constituency and list seats allocated separately, no compensation | Japan |
2. Quotas and divisors
Hare quota: \( \text{valid votes} \div \text{seats} \).
Droop quota (used with STV):
$$\text{Droop quota} = \left\lfloor \frac{\text{valid votes}}{\text{seats} + 1} \right\rfloor + 1$$Highest-average (divisor) methods: each party’s votes are divided by a series of divisors and seats go to the largest quotients.
- D’Hondt: divisors 1, 2, 3, 4… — slightly favours larger parties.
- Sainte-Laguë: divisors 1, 3, 5, 7… — more neutral between large and small parties.
3. Measuring party systems: the effective number of parties
Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979) weighted parties by size:
$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^{2}}$$where \( p_i \) is each party’s share of votes (or seats) as a fraction. With the vote shares above (0.48, 0.30, 0.14, 0.08):
$$N = \frac{1}{0.2304 + 0.0900 + 0.0196 + 0.0064} = \frac{1}{0.3464} \approx 2.89$$Two equal parties give exactly 2; four parties with shares 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 give \( 1 \div 0.30 \approx 3.33 \). Disproportionality between votes and seats is measured by indices such as Michael Gallagher’s least-squares index (1991).
4. Duverger’s law and its critics
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (French 1951; English 1954):
- Duverger’s law: the simple-majority single-ballot (plurality) system favours a two-party system.
- Duverger’s hypotheses: PR favours a multiparty system; the two-ballot majority system favours a multiparty system tempered by alliances.
Two mechanisms:
- Mechanical effect: third parties win far fewer seats than their vote share.
- Psychological effect: voters desert third parties to avoid wasting votes (“strategic voting”), and politicians avoid them.
Exceptions and refinements: Canada and India have long had more than two significant parties under FPTP, because third parties are regionally concentrated (William Riker, 1982, discussed India’s case). Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (1967), and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (1994), measured the effects; Sartori and others reversed the arrow: party systems also shape the choice of electoral system.
Part B: Political Parties and Party Systems
5. Definitions
| Thinker | Definition |
|---|---|
| Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770) | A body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed |
| Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) | A team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election |
| Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (1976) | Any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office |
Functions: representation, elite recruitment, goal formulation, interest aggregation (Almond), political socialisation and mobilisation, organisation of government and opposition.
Origins (LaPalombara and Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, 1966): institutional (from inside parliaments), historical-situational (crises of legitimacy, integration, participation), and developmental (modernisation).
6. Types of party
| Type | Thinker (year) | Features |
|---|---|---|
| Cadre party | Duverger (1951) | Notables, loose structure, few members; nineteenth-century liberal and conservative parties |
| Mass party | Duverger (1951) | Large dues-paying membership, branches, ideology; socialist parties |
| Party of individual representation vs party of social integration | Sigmund Neumann (1956) | Representation parties are electoral machines; integration parties enclose members’ lives |
| Catch-all party | Otto Kirchheimer (1966) | De-ideologised, appeals to all voters, strengthens leaders, downgrades members and class base |
| Electoral-professional party | Angelo Panebianco (Italian 1982; English 1988) | Run by professionals and media experts rather than bureaucrats |
| Cartel party | Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) | Parties collude, use state subventions, and become semi-state agencies, limiting competition |
Robert Michels’ iron law of oligarchy (Political Parties, 1911) applies to all of these: organisation produces rule by a few.
7. Cleavages: Lipset and Rokkan
S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments” (1967):
| Revolution | Cleavage |
|---|---|
| National revolution | Centre vs periphery (dominant vs subject cultures, regions) |
| State vs church | |
| Industrial revolution | Land vs industry (rural vs urban interests) |
| Owner vs worker (class) |
Freezing hypothesis: the party systems of the 1960s reflected, with few exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s. Later writers described dealignment (weakening of party loyalties) and new cleavages such as materialist vs post-materialist values (Inglehart) and globalisation winners vs losers.
8. Party systems
Giovanni Sartori’s typology (Parties and Party Systems, 1976), counting only “relevant” parties (those with coalition or blackmail potential):
| Class | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| One-party | Only one party is allowed | USSR, China |
| Hegemonic party | Other parties exist as satellites; no real turnover allowed | Mexico under the PRI; Poland under communism |
| Predominant party | Competitive, but one party keeps winning an absolute majority | India under Congress (to 1967), Japan’s LDP, Sweden’s Social Democrats |
| Two-party | Two parties alternate in single-party government | UK (historically), US |
| Limited (moderate) pluralism | About 3–5 parties; small ideological distance; bipolar coalitions; centripetal competition | Germany, the Netherlands |
| Extreme (polarised) pluralism | More than five parties; anti-system parties; bilateral oppositions; occupied centre; centrifugal competition; irresponsible opposition; politics of outbidding | Weimar Germany, Italy’s First Republic, Chile before 1973 |
| Atomised | Many parties, none with a significant effect | Very fluid systems |
Jean Blondel (1968): two-party, two-and-a-half-party, multiparty with a dominant party, multiparty without a dominant party.
The Indian party system
- Rajni Kothari, “The Congress ‘System’ in India” (Asian Survey, 1964): a party of consensus (Congress) surrounded by parties of pressure working at a “margin of pressure”; competition largely inside Congress through factions.
- W.H. Morris-Jones: a dominant party system — dominance co-existing with competition.
- After 1967 and especially from 1989, coalition and multiparty politics (Yogendra Yadav’s “third electoral system”); since 2014 many writers describe a new phase with the BJP as the dominant pole.
Part C: Interest Groups
9. Types and theories
Interest (pressure) groups seek to influence policy without seeking to form a government themselves.
Almond and Powell’s four types (Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, 1966):
| Type | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Anomic | Spontaneous, short-lived outbursts: riots, demonstrations | A sudden protest after a police firing |
| Non-associational | Based on kinship, ethnicity, region, religion; informal, intermittent | Caste or clan networks |
| Institutional | Formal organisations with other functions that also press interests | The army, the bureaucracy, churches |
| Associational | Specialised bodies formed to articulate interests | Trade unions, FICCI, farmers’ unions |
Other classifications: sectional (protective) vs cause (promotional) groups; insider vs outsider groups (Wyn Grant): insiders are consulted by government, outsiders campaign from outside.
| Theory | Thinker (year) | Claim |
|---|---|---|
| Group theory / pluralism | Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (1908); David Truman, The Governmental Process (1951) | Politics is the interaction of groups; overlapping membership and “potential groups” keep the balance |
| Upper-class bias | E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (1960) | “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” |
| Collective action | Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965) | Rational individuals free-ride on public goods; small groups and those offering selective incentives organise more easily; The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982): distributional coalitions slow growth |
| Neo-corporatism | Philippe Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” (1974) | A limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, functionally differentiated groups, licensed by the state with a representational monopoly; societal (Sweden, Austria) vs state corporatism (Salazar’s Portugal) |
| Sub-governments | Iron triangles; Hugh Heclo’s issue networks (1978); policy communities | Policy made in closed or open networks of agencies, committees and groups |
Part D: Social Movements, New Social Movements, NGOs and Civil Society
10. Social movements
Charles Tilly (Social Movements, 1768–2004, 2004) defines a social movement by three elements: sustained campaigns of claims, a repertoire of performances (meetings, marches, petitions) and public displays of WUNC — worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment.
| Theory | Thinkers (year) | Explains mobilisation by… |
|---|---|---|
| Collective behaviour | Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (1962): value-added model (structural conduciveness, strain, generalised belief, precipitating factors, mobilisation, social control) | Strain and shared beliefs |
| Relative deprivation | Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970) | The gap between what people expect and what they get |
| Resource mobilisation | John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) | Organisations, money, leaders and networks; movements as rational actors (“social movement organisations”) |
| Political process / political opportunity structure | Peter Eisinger (1973); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (1982); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (1994) | Openings in the political system: elite divisions, allies, reduced repression |
| Framing | David Snow and Robert Benford (from 1986) | Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames that make grievances meaningful |
| Contentious politics | McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (2001) | Mechanisms and processes common to movements, revolutions and nationalism |
11. New social movements (NSMs)
From the late 1960s, European theorists argued that movements for the environment, peace, women, gay and lesbian rights, and against nuclear power differed from the old labour movement.
| Feature | Old (labour) movements | New social movements |
|---|---|---|
| Base | Working class | New middle class, students, educated young |
| Issues | Distribution of wealth, wages, ownership | Identity, culture, quality of life, autonomy, post-material values |
| Target | The state and capital | Civil society and culture as much as the state |
| Organisation | Centralised unions and parties | Decentralised networks, informal, anti-hierarchical |
| Action | Strikes, party politics | Direct action, symbolic protest, lifestyle politics |
Theorists: Alain Touraine (post-industrial society; movements struggle over historicity, the control of cultural models); Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present (1989): collective identity; Claus Offe, “New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics” (1985); Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (1981): NSMs resist the colonisation of the lifeworld by system imperatives; Ronald Inglehart: post-materialist values.
Critique: Craig Calhoun, “‘New Social Movements’ of the Early Nineteenth Century” (1993): identity and lifestyle movements are not new.
Indian examples: Chipko (from 1973, Garhwal Himalaya); Narmada Bachao Andolan (Medha Patkar, against the Sardar Sarovar dam); the Silent Valley campaign; the Dalit, women’s and farmers’ movements. Gail Omvedt, Reinventing Revolution (1993), studied India’s new social movements.
12. Civil society and NGOs
Civil society — the sphere of voluntary association between family and state (and, for some, market).
| Thinker | Idea |
|---|---|
| Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) | Civil society as polished, commercial society |
| Hegel, Philosophy of Right (1820) | Civil society between the family and the state: the sphere of needs and market |
| Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835, 1840) | Voluntary associations as schools of democracy |
| Gramsci | Civil society as the terrain of hegemony |
| Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962) | The public sphere of rational-critical debate |
| Putnam (1993, 2000) | Associations generate social capital |
| Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed (2004) | Civil society of rights-bearing citizens (a small elite in India) vs political society of “populations” negotiating with the state through welfare and illegal-but-tolerated claims |
NGOs
- The term entered official use with Article 71 of the UN Charter (1945): ECOSOC may consult non-governmental organisations.
- Types: operational (service delivery) vs advocacy (campaigning); local, national and international (INGOs); variants such as GONGOs (government-organised) and QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous).
- Transnational advocacy networks: Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (1998): the boomerang pattern — when domestic channels are blocked, local groups reach international allies who pressure their state from outside. Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society (2003).
Civil society campaigns
| Campaign | Outcome |
|---|---|
| International Campaign to Ban Landmines | Ottawa Treaty (1997); ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize |
| Jubilee 2000 | Debt relief for poor countries |
| International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) | Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted (2017); 2017 Nobel Peace Prize |
| Anti-apartheid movement | International boycott and sanctions against South Africa |
| Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), Rajasthan, founded 1990 (Aruna Roy and others) | Public hearings (jan sunwai) on local spending; the campaign led to the Right to Information Act, 2005 |
| India Against Corruption (2011, Anna Hazare) | Pressure for the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 |
Criticisms: “NGO-isation” depoliticises movements; NGOs are accountable to donors, not citizens; foreign funding raises sovereignty concerns (India’s Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, amended 2020).
Part E: Revolutions
13. Definitions
| Thinker | Definition |
|---|---|
| Samuel Huntington (1968) | A rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies |
| Theda Skocpol (1979) | Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below |
| Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (1963) | Revolution is about founding freedom; the American Revolution succeeded because it focused on political freedom, the French failed because it turned to the “social question” of poverty |
14. Theories of revolution
| Generation / approach | Thinker (year) | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Marxist | Marx and Engels | Contradiction between forces and relations of production; class struggle; Lenin’s vanguard party; Mao’s peasant-based people’s war |
| Paradox of improvement | Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856) | Revolution broke out where conditions were improving; the most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it begins to reform |
| First generation: natural history | Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (1938) | Compared England, America, France and Russia; stages like a fever: old regime → rule of the moderates → accession of the extremists → terror and virtue → Thermidor |
| Second generation: psychological and systemic | James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution” (1962) | J-curve: revolution is likely when a long period of rising expectations and satisfaction is followed by a sharp reversal |
| Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970) | Relative deprivation | |
| Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (1966) | A disequilibrated social system whose values and environment no longer match | |
| Huntington (1968) | Rapid mobilisation outrunning institutions | |
| Mobilisation | Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (1978) | Revolution as multiple sovereignty: rival blocs both claim control of the state |
| Third generation: structural | Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (1979) | France, Russia and China: state breakdown under international military and economic pressure, plus peasant revolts enabled by agrarian structures; “revolutions are not made; they come”; non-voluntarist |
| Barrington Moore (1966); Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (1969) | Peasants and class coalitions | |
| Fourth generation | Jack Goldstone (“Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation”, 1980; later work on a fourth generation) | Adds ideology, culture, leadership, networks and contingency |
Later cases: the “velvet” revolutions of Eastern Europe (1989), the colour revolutions (2003–05) and the Arab Spring (from 2010) were largely urban, non-violent and negotiated, testing older class-based and violent definitions.
Memory Tricks
Don’t Confuse
| This | vs | That |
|---|---|---|
| MMP — list seats compensate (Germany, NZ) | vs | Parallel — no compensation (Japan) |
| Droop quota — votes ÷ (seats + 1), plus 1 | vs | Hare quota — votes ÷ seats |
| Kirchheimer — catch-all (1966) | vs | Katz and Mair — cartel (1995) |
| Predominant party — competitive, one party wins repeatedly | vs | Hegemonic party — no real competition allowed |
| Moderate pluralism — centripetal | vs | Polarised pluralism — centrifugal, anti-system parties |
| Resource mobilisation — McCarthy and Zald | vs | Political opportunity — Eisinger, McAdam, Tarrow |
| Touraine / Melucci — NSM identity | vs | Tilly — campaigns, repertoires, WUNC |
| Civil society — rights-bearing citizens | vs | Political society — Chatterjee’s governed populations |
| Davies — J-curve (1962) | vs | Gurr — relative deprivation (1970) |
| Skocpol — structural, state breakdown (1979) | vs | Brinton — natural history, stages (1938) |
Common Mistakes
Practice
All questions below are original practice questions written in the UGC NET format. They are not previous-year questions.
Level 1: Foundation
- Which electoral system is used to elect the President of India?
- What does WUNC stand for in Tilly’s account of social movements?
- Who coined the term “catch-all party”?
Answers
- Proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote (secret ballot), by an electoral college of elected MPs and MLAs.
- Worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment.
- Otto Kirchheimer (1966).
Level 2: Exam-style MCQs
Q1. (Practice) In a constituency electing 3 members by STV, 40,000 valid votes are cast. The Droop quota is:
- (a) 10,000
- (b) 10,001
- (c) 13,334
- (d) 13,333
Answer and explanation
(b) 10,001. \( \lfloor 40{,}000 \div (3 + 1) \rfloor + 1 = 10{,}000 + 1 = 10{,}001 \). Option (c) is the Hare quota rounded up (\( 40{,}000 \div 3 \approx 13{,}333.3 \)), a common trap.
Q2. (Practice) Four seats are allocated by the D’Hondt method. Party X wins 52,000 votes, Party Y 28,000 and Party Z 20,000. The seat allocation is:
- (a) X 2, Y 1, Z 1
- (b) X 3, Y 1, Z 0
- (c) X 2, Y 2, Z 0
- (d) X 1, Y 2, Z 1
Answer and explanation
(a) X 2, Y 1, Z 1. Quotients: X 52,000, 26,000, 17,333; Y 28,000, 14,000; Z 20,000, 10,000. The four largest are 52,000 (X), 28,000 (Y), 26,000 (X) and 20,000 (Z).
Q3. (Practice) Consider the following statements about Sartori’s typology of party systems:
- In polarised pluralism, competition is centrifugal and anti-system parties are present.
- A predominant-party system allows genuine competition even though one party repeatedly wins an absolute majority.
- A hegemonic-party system allows rotation in power through free elections.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 only
- (b) 1 and 2 only
- (c) 2 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation
(b) 1 and 2 only. In a hegemonic system the other parties are satellites; turnover is not allowed.
Q4. (Practice) The vote shares of three parties are 50%, 30% and 20%. The effective number of parties (Laakso–Taagepera) is closest to:
- (a) 2.00
- (b) 2.63
- (c) 3.00
- (d) 3.33
Answer and explanation
(b) 2.63. \( N = 1 \div (0.25 + 0.09 + 0.04) = 1 \div 0.38 \approx 2.63 \).
Level 3: Assertion–reason, match and sequence
For assertion–reason questions, use these options:
- (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
- (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
- (c) A is true, but R is false
- (d) A is false, but R is true
Q1. (Practice) Assertion (A): India has had several significant parties despite using the first-past-the-post system. Reason (R): Many Indian parties have geographically concentrated support, which lets them win seats in particular states.
Answer and explanation
(a). Regional concentration blunts Duverger’s mechanical effect, which is the standard explanation for India’s (and Canada’s) exception.
Q2. (Practice) Assertion (A): Olson argued that large latent groups find collective action difficult. Reason (R): Rational individuals can enjoy the public good without contributing, so they have an incentive to free-ride.
Answer and explanation
(a). The free-rider problem is Olson’s explanation (The Logic of Collective Action, 1965); selective incentives are the remedy.
Q3. (Practice) Match List I (Thinker) with List II (Concept).
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. Katz and Mair | I. Boomerang pattern |
| B. Keck and Sikkink | II. Cartel party |
| C. James C. Davies | III. Representational monopoly (corporatism) |
| D. Philippe Schmitter | IV. J-curve |
- (a) A-II, B-I, C-IV, D-III
- (b) A-I, B-II, C-IV, D-III
- (c) A-II, B-IV, C-I, D-III
- (d) A-II, B-I, C-III, D-IV
Answer and explanation
(a) A-II, B-I, C-IV, D-III.
Q4. (Practice) Arrange the following works on revolution in chronological order:
- Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions
- Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution
- Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
- Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution”
- (a) 2, 4, 3, 1
- (b) 2, 3, 4, 1
- (c) 4, 2, 3, 1
- (d) 2, 4, 1, 3
Answer and explanation
(a). Brinton 1938 → Davies 1962 → Huntington 1968 → Skocpol 1979.
Q5. (Practice) Arrange the following classes of Sartori’s typology in the order of increasing fragmentation (number of relevant parties):
- Polarised (extreme) pluralism
- One-party
- Limited (moderate) pluralism
- Two-party
- (a) 2, 4, 3, 1
- (b) 4, 2, 3, 1
- (c) 2, 3, 4, 1
- (d) 2, 4, 1, 3
Answer and explanation
(a). One-party → two-party → limited pluralism (about three to five parties) → polarised pluralism (more than five). Sartori’s full list runs one-party, hegemonic, predominant, two-party, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism, atomised.
Quick Revision Table
| Thinker / item | Work / detail | Year | Key idea |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burke | Present Discontents | 1770 | Party defined by shared principle |
| Bentley | The Process of Government | 1908 | Group theory |
| Michels | Political Parties | 1911 | Iron law of oligarchy |
| Brinton | The Anatomy of Revolution | 1938 | Stages; Thermidor |
| Duverger | Political Parties | 1951 | Plurality → two-party; cadre vs mass |
| Truman | The Governmental Process | 1951 | Potential groups |
| Downs | An Economic Theory of Democracy | 1957 | Party as team seeking office |
| Schattschneider | The Semisovereign People | 1960 | Upper-class accent |
| Davies | “Toward a Theory of Revolution” | 1962 | J-curve |
| Kothari | “The Congress ‘System’ in India” | 1964 | Party of consensus, parties of pressure |
| Olson | The Logic of Collective Action | 1965 | Free rider; selective incentives |
| Kirchheimer | Catch-all party | 1966 | De-ideologised parties |
| Almond and Powell | Comparative Politics | 1966 | Four types of interest group |
| Lipset and Rokkan | “Cleavage Structures…” | 1967 | Four cleavages; freezing |
| Gurr | Why Men Rebel | 1970 | Relative deprivation |
| Schmitter | “Still the Century of Corporatism?” | 1974 | Neo-corporatism |
| Sartori | Parties and Party Systems | 1976 | Seven classes; polarised pluralism |
| McCarthy and Zald | Resource mobilisation | 1977 | SMOs, resources |
| Tilly | From Mobilization to Revolution | 1978 | Multiple sovereignty |
| Laakso and Taagepera | Effective number of parties | 1979 | \( N = 1 / \sum p_i^2 \) |
| Skocpol | States and Social Revolutions | 1979 | State breakdown + peasant revolt |
| Offe | “New Social Movements” | 1985 | NSMs challenge institutional politics |
| Melucci | Nomads of the Present | 1989 | Collective identity |
| Katz and Mair | Cartel party | 1995 | State-subsidised parties |
| Keck and Sikkink | Activists Beyond Borders | 1998 | Boomerang pattern |
| Tilly | Social Movements, 1768–2004 | 2004 | Campaigns, repertoires, WUNC |
| Chatterjee | The Politics of the Governed | 2004 | Political society |
Key Takeaways
What’s Next
- Comparative Political Analysis — Quick Revision — the whole unit on one page
- Development and Democratisation — how parties and movements shape transitions
- Democracy and Power — pluralism and elitism in political theory
- Paper 1 link: Methods and Steps of Research — survey and case-study methods used in electoral and movement research